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Domestic Violence Torts: Righting a Civil Wrong
Camille Carey*
I. INTRODUCTION

Tort law defines what constitutes wrongful conduct in particular
situations and dictates how tortfeasors legally compensate for their wrongful
conduct. Sometimes tort law governs conduct in intimate relations, and
other times it oversees the conduct of strangers or corporations. Tort law,
especially personal injury law, has become an integral aspect of American
society. It guides how individuals and companies conduct themselves and
dictates how and when injured parties are compensated for their harms.
Domestic violence harms have been conspicuously absent from the
development of tort law. Domestic violence is pervasive, and its harms are
serious. Pain and suffering, physical injuries, and even death arising out of
abusive relationships are compensable through tort law, but these claims are
rarely filed or discussed.
In its current iteration, tort law offers a number of well-suited but
underused remedies for domestic violence victims. These common law
claims were not created to provide redress for intimate partner violence, and
historically were not allowed to do so. However, in contemporary times, tort
claims are effective tools for legal recourse for domestic violence victims
and should be pursued aggressively and frequently.1
* Associate Professor, University of New Mexico School of Law. I would like to thank participants
in the faculty workshops at the University of New Mexico School of Law and the William S. Boyd
School of Law, University of Las Vegas, the members of the Joint University of Colorado Law
School and University of Denver Sturm College of Law Clinicians' Work in Progress Series, Max
Minzner, Dawinder Sidhu, Ernesto Longa, Glenn Beard, and Robert Solomon. I would also like to
thank Erin Joyce and KC Manierre for their research assistance.
1. I will refer to domestic violence victims as females throughout, given that the vast majority
of domestic violence victims are women. PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, NCJ 183781, FULL REPORT OF THE PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE,
AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE

AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY, at iv (2000), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/pubssum/18378l.htm (finding that "[a]pproximately 1.3 million women and 835,000 men are physically
assaulted by an intimate partner annually in the United States"); JENNIFER L. TRUMAN, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 235508, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2010, at 10

(2011), available at http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfin?ty=pbdetail&iid=2224 (finding that "[tihe
percentage of female victims (22%) of intimate partner violence was about 4 times that of male
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The common law doctrines of chastisement, coverture, and spousal
immunity historically shielded abusers from tort liability for domestic
violence. Now that these sexist doctrines have lost their hold, tort law is ripe
for use in the domestic violence context. Domestic violence victims can use
existing common law and statutory tort causes of action-such as battery,
assault, and intentional infliction of emotional distress-to sue their abusers
for abusive conduct. Existing common law causes of action and a very
small collection of newer tort claims provide easy avenues for development
in this area of law. Through tort suits, victims can achieve financial
compensation for harms, assume a position of control over legal claims
addressing the abuse, experience both power and agency in an otherwise
subordinating relationship, and seek deterrence of an abuser's abusive
conduct.
This paper will discuss both traditional and specific tort claims that can
be brought by domestic violence victims. It explores the dearth of domestic
violence tort claims and looks at historical and contemporary factors causing
the dearth of such claims. It sets forth the many benefits offered by tort law
for domestic violence plaintiffs and proposes a paradigm shift in domestic
violence lawyering to incorporate significantly more tort litigation.
Part I provides an overview of existing tort causes of action that are well
suited for use by domestic violence victims. These tort actions include
traditional common law claims like assault, battery, and intentional infliction
of emotional distress. They also include several local and state tort claims
for domestic violence and gender-motivated violence. The civil rights
remedy under the Violence Against Women Act is discussed briefly to give
context to the development of specific tort claims for gender-motivated and
domestic violence. Part II describes the dearth of domestic violence tort
claims and offers reasons why so few domestic violence tort claims have
been brought. It examines how the common law history of chastisement,
coverture, spousal immunity, and judicial obstinacy has barred these claims
and affects the frequency of these claims today. This section also describes
how insurance policy exclusions and other factors have contributed to the
sparseness of domestic violence tort claims. Part III explores how tort
claims can be productive avenues of relief for domestic violence victims.
Positive potential outcomes for domestic violence plaintiffs include financial
benefits, therapeutic benefits, and deterrence. Part IV discusses some
shortcomings of tort law in remedying domestic violence harms. Part V
proposes a paradigm shift in legal approaches to domestic violence, with
victims (5%)").
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domestic violence tort law occupying a more significant role.

II: TORT CLAIMS FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS: COMMON LAW
TORTS, VAWA, AND LOCAL AND STATE CLAIMS FOR DOMESTIC OR

GENDER-RELATED VIOLENCE
A. Common Law Claims
Pursuing common law tort claims should become a prominent approach
within domestic violence law, leading a paradigm shift in how law can be
used to combat abuse. Tort claims offer ready-made remedies that can
provide meaningful financial and emotional benefits to domestic violence
victims. Physical violence, sexual abuse, mental abuse, and other abusive
behaviors in domestic violence relationships often create liability in tort.
Common law torts, including negligence, recklessness, and especially
intentional torts, can provide domestic violence victims with benefits not
necessarily offered by other legal actions.
Intentional torts are effective vehicles for seeking redress for domestic
violence harms. The types of abuse frequently perpetrated in domestic
violence relationships tend to meet the elements of intentional torts, and thus
many acts of domestic violence are actionable. The most pertinent causes of
action for domestic violence harms include battery, assault, false
imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Each will be
addressed in turn.
1. Battery
A battery occurs when the defendant intends to make harmful or
offensive bodily contact with the plaintiff, the plaintiff does not consent to
the contact, and harmful or offensive contact results. 2 The defendant need
not intend the particular type of harm that results.3 For instance, the
2.

DAN B. DOBBs, THE LAW OF TORTS 52-53 (West Group 2000); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS § 13 (1965) ("[Harmful Contact:] An actor is subject to liability to another for battery if
(a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other or a third
person, or an imminent apprehension of such a contact, and (b) a harmful contact with the person of
the other directly or indirectly results." (emphasis added)); Id. § 18(1) ("[Offensive Contact:] (1) An
actor is subject to liability to another for battery if (a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or
offensive contact with the person of the other or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such
a contact, and (b) an offensive contact with the person of the other directly or indirectly results."
(emphasis added)).
3. Jurisdictions differ as to whether the intent required for battery requires "dual intent," that
defendant intended to cause bodily contact and intended that the contact be harmful or offensive, or
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defendant is liable for battery even if he intends only an offensive contact
but a harmful contact results.4 Battery can also occur when the defendant
acts intending to cause apprehension of a battery, and harmful or offensive
contact results.5
The tort of battery is recognized as primarily protecting two interests: an
interest in physical integrity, i.e., freedom from harmful bodily contact, and
a dignitary interest, i.e., freedom from offensive bodily contact.6 Offending
"a reasonable sense of personal dignity" means that the contact "would
offend the ordinary person" and would be "unwarranted by the social usages
prevalent at the time and place at which it is inflicted."7
In the context of domestic violence, abuse often violates one or both of
these protected interests. Physical abuse violates the victim's interest in her
own physical integrity and the victim's inherent right to be free from
physical harm.8 Physical violence, including any aggressive touching, by
the abuser also violates the victim's dignitary interest. Protection from
unwanted or offensive contact is an integral goal of the law of battery.9
Domestic violence victims share this same protection offered to other tort
victims, but abusive physical contact is particularly offensive in domestic

"single intent," that defendant intended a bodily contact that turned out to be harmful or offensive.
DOBBS, supra note 2, 58-59. Compare White v. Muniz, 999 P.2d 814, 815 (Colo. 2000) (en banc)
(requiring dual intent), with Villa v. Derouen, 614 So. 2d 714, 717 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (requiring
single intent).
The Restatement (Third) of Torts failed to address or resolve this issue.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM

§ 1 (2010)

("A person acts

with the intent to produce a consequence if: (a) the person acts with the purpose of producing that
consequence; or (b) the person acts knowing that the consequence is substantially certain to result.").
Joseph H. King, The Torts Restatement's Inchoate Definition ofIntent for Battery, and Reflections
on the ProvinceofRestatements, 38 PEPP. L. REv. 623 (2011). King provides: "[The § 1] definition
is an umbrella one, providing an all-inclusive definition of what it means to 'intend' something. It
simply defines the state of mind needed to support a finding that a defendant intended 'something' as
a 'consequence.' But, before a person may be determined to have entertained the necessary intent for
a specific tort, we have to also know what 'consequence' must have been intended for that tort. The
Section I definition does not address that aspect of intent-the nature of the 'consequence' that must
have been intended to support various traditional torts that require intent, such as battery." Id. at
624. See also Nancy J. Moore, Intent and Consent in the Tort of Battery: Confusion and
Controversy, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1585, 1595-96 (2012) (discussing "how a Third Restatement might
best formulate intentional tort doctrine in cases involving either harmfil or offensive battery,"
specifically intent requirements, given the "ambiguity of the relevant Second Restatement
provisions").
4. See DOBBS, supra note 2, 58-59.
5.
6.
7.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 13, 18 (1965).
DOMINICK R. VETRI, TORT LAW AND PRACTICE 643 (LexisNexis, 4th ed. 2011).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 19 cmt. a (1965).

8. DOBBS, supra note 2, at 54 (noting that battery "vindicates the plaintiffs rights of
autonomy").
9. Id.
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violence situations because it violates the trust that should be present in an
intimate partner relationship and is generally part of a pattern of abuse that is
aimed at subordinating and controlling the victim.
Common acts of domestic violence that constitute battery include:
slapping, punching, kicking, choking, pushing, twisting and breaking limbs,
burning, stabbing, mutilation, throwing the victim, or throwing objects at the
victim. 10 Abusers may push the victim down the stairs, out of a moving car,
or against a wall, causing serious injury." Domestic violence perpetrators
frequently use extreme violence against their partners, including extensive
beatings, torture, and using weapons, such as knives and guns, to inflict
serious injury or disfigurement and possibly even death.12
Sexual battery is also extremely common in domestic violence
relationships. 13 Domestic violence perpetrators engage in a wide range of
behaviors that constitute actionable sexual battery. An abuser may
physically force an intimate partner to have sex against her will. He may
coerce her to have sexual relations through threats of additional violence or
force her to have sex after being beaten or in front of her children.14 He may
also force her to perform sex acts she does not want to perform, including
oral or anal sex, sex with third parties, and sex with objects. He may also
refuse to allow the victim to use contraception to protect against pregnancy
and sexually transmitted diseases.' 5 Many states have statutory causes of
action for rape and sexual battery.16 In the absence of a specific statute, a
domestic violence plaintiff can file a common law claim for battery or
sexual battery.
2. Assault
Many domestic violence plaintiffs also will be able to file claims for
10. LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 79 (1979); see generally id. at 78-106
(noting types of physical assaults the women studied experienced and detailing some of their
stories).
11. Anne L. Ganley, UnderstandingDomestic Violence: PreparatoryReadingfor Participants,
in SUSAN SCHECHTER & ANNE L. GANLEY, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A NATIONAL CURRICULUM FOR
FAMILY PRESERVATION PRACTITIONERS 7, 12 (Janet Carter ed., 1995).
12. EVAN STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL: THE ENTRAPMENT OF WOMEN IN PERSONAL LIFE 242
(2007); Ganley, supra note 11, at 12.
13. See generally WALKER, supra note 10, at 107-126 (discussing sexual abuse in violent
relationships and providing personal accounts of women who experienced sexual abuse).
14. Ganley, supra note 11, at 12.
15. Sara L. Ainsworth, Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 24 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 303, 326 (2013).
16. VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: LAW AND LITIGATION § 17:11 (David Frazee et al. eds.,
1998).
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assault. An assault occurs when the defendant acts intending to cause a
harmful or offensive contact with the plaintiff or acts intending to cause an
imminent apprehension of such a contact, and the plaintiff is put in imminent
apprehension of a harmful or an offensive contact.17 Some courts require
that this apprehension of a contact be reasonable, as opposed to allowing for
a claim based on actual apprehension.' 8 Threats by words alone are
insufficient to sustain a claim for assault "unless[,] together with other acts
or circumstances[, the threats] put the [plaintiff] in reasonable apprehension
of an imminent harmful or offensive contact. . . ."9
Assault is extremely common in abusive relationships. Abusers seek to
control their partners through threats of violence and intimidation. In one
study conducted in Pittsburgh, 97% of the participants reported that they had
been threatened by their abusive spouses. 20 Sixty-one percent of these
victims indicated that they had been threatened "often." 2 1 Abusers
commonly make verbal threats, threatening to kill the intimate partner and
also often threatening to commit suicide after doing so. Threats are also
made through conduct, such as displaying weapons, stalking, driving
recklessly with the victim in the vehicle, or having someone else stalk the
victim. 22
The conduct that incites imminent apprehension for assault in the
domestic violence context can be subtle yet especially powerful for a
particular victim given the ongoing power, control, and abusiveness of the
relationship. Prior abuse creates a context for the victim's understanding of
the meaning of the abuser's conduct. Yelling or threatening can more
readily signify a true threat of harmful or offensive contact when the
Once a
perpetrator has previously engaged in abusive behavior.23
perpetrator has used violence either with that victim or another victim from a
prior relationship, a threat of violence becomes much more actual and
imminent.
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 21(1) (1965) ("(1) An actor is subject to liability to
another for assault if (a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of
the other or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such a contact, and (b) the other is
thereby put in such imminent apprehension.").
18. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 44 (W. Page
Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984).
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 31 (1965).
20. MICHAEL P. JOHNSON, A TYPOLOGY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: INTIMATE TERRORISM,
VIOLENT RESISTANCE, AND SITUATIONAL COUPLE VIOLENCE 26 (2008).
21. Id.
22. Ganley, supranote 11, at 12.
23. See MARY ANN DUTr0N, EMPOWERING AND HEALING THE BATTERED WOMAN: A MODEL
FOR ASSESSMENT AND INTERVENTION 18 (1992).
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3. False Imprisonment
Many domestic violence victims will have claims for false
imprisonment. False imprisonment occurs when a defendant acts intending
to confine the plaintiff within boundaries fixed by the defendant, the
defendant's act directly or indirectly results in confinement of the plaintiff,
and the plaintiff is conscious of the confinement or is harmed by it. 24
Confinement for false imprisonment purposes may be achieved by physical
25
force, threats of physical force, or other duress.
False imprisonment is common in domestic violence situations. The
acts constituting false imprisonment include locking the victim in a closet,
room, or the home; forcing her to sit in a car, on the floor, or in one location
for hours; prohibiting the victim from leaving the home; or refusing to give
the victim keys to the home so that she is either automatically locked out if
she leaves or is restricted from leaving without the ability to lock the door.26
Victims may also be able to establish a claim for false imprisonment based
on an abuser's conduct during extended and ongoing sessions of abuse. It is
not uncommon for physical attacks to continue for hours or days, with the
27
In these
abuser sometimes taking breaks to rest, sleep, or drink alcohol.
circumstances, the victim is confined by the abuser's threat-already
realized-of continued violence.
4. Stalking
Stalking is also a recognized civil claim in some jurisdictions. Often
codified, many civil stalking provisions were enacted in response to
celebrity stalking.28 These statutes, as well as common law claims for
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 35 (1965). See also id. § 36 (1965) ("(1) To make
the actor liable for false imprisonment, the other's confinement within the boundaries fixed by the
actor must be complete. (2) The confinement is complete although there is a reasonable means of
escape, unless the other knows of it. (3) The actor does not become liable for false imprisonment by
intentionally preventing another from going in a particular direction in which he has a right or
privilege to go.").
25. Id. § 39 (1965) ("The confinement may be by overpowering physical force, or by
submission to physical force."); id § 40 (1965) ("The confinement may be by submission to a threat
to apply physical force to the other's person immediately upon the other's going or attempting to go
beyond the area in which the actor intends to confine him."); id § 40A (1965) ("The confinement
may be by submission to duress other than threats of physical force, where such duress is sufficient
to make the consent given ineffective to bar the action."). Confinement may also be achieved
through asserted legal authority. Id. §41 (1965).
26. STARK, supranote 12, at 208.
27. Id. at 246.
28. 1 THOMSON/WEST, DOMESTIC TORTS: FAMILY VIOLENCE, CONFLICT AND SEXUAL ABUSE,
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stalking, are particularly helpful to domestic violence victims given the
prevalence of stalking in abusive relationships. Stalking is second only to
assault in abusive acts utilized by domestic violence perpetrators. 29
Behaviors constituting stalking include: following the victim, maintaining
close physical or visual proximity to her, and threatening or tormenting
her. 30
5. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress and Other Claims
Domestic violence plaintiffs often also have viable claims for intentional
infliction of emotional distress (IIED). A defendant is liable under IIED for
emotional distress and any resulting bodily harm when he "intentionally or
recklessly causes severe emotional harm" to the plaintiff through "extreme
and outrageous conduct." 31 Extreme and outrageous conduct is generally
considered "conduct exceeding all bounds usually tolerated by decent
society, of a nature which is especially calculated to cause, and does cause,
mental distress of a very serious kind." 3 2
In the domestic violence context, most successful IIED claims have
been brought by plaintiffs who were threatened with or subjected to physical
abuse. 3 3 These cases have generally involved intolerable or atrocious
conduct that was intended to cause severe emotional harm to the plaintiff.34
Some courts have been reluctant to allow IIED claims against a spouse. 35
IIED claims and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims, discussed
below, recognize stand-alone emotional harm in which the plaintiff can
recover for emotional harm without needing to prove physical injury. 3 6
Other possible intentional tort claims in the domestic violence context
include: invasion of privacy, 3 7 defamation, 38 and harassment. 39 Domestic
REVISED EDITION 135 (2005).
29.

STARK, supranote 12, at 256.

30.
31.

VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: LAW AND LITIGATION, supra note 16, § 17:13.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM

§ 46

(2012).
32. KEETON ET AL., supra note 18, at 60 (citations omitted).
33. 1 THOMSON/WEST, supranote 28, at 117.
34. Id.
35. See infra Part IB.
36. See infra notes 64-65. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM
§ 45 cmt. a (2012) ("Emotional harm encompasses a variety of mental states, including fright, fear,
sadness, sorrow, despondency, anxiety, humiliation, depression (and other mental illnesses), and a
host of other detrimental-from mildly unpleasant to disabling-mental conditions.").
37. VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: LAW AND LITIGATION, supra note 16, § 17:15.
38. 1 THOMSON/WEST, supra note 28, at 143-46.
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violence plaintiffs may have viable claims for tortious infliction of a
venereal disease. 4 0 They may be able to seek damages for interference with
educational opportunity1 or interference with custodial or visitation rights.42
Victims may have valid claims for economic torts such as interference with
contractual relations if the abuser controlled the victim's access to money or
otherwise prevented the victim from obtaining financial independence.43
Plaintiffs may also be able to sue for property torts like conversion4 or
trespass to chattelS45 if the abuser broke or sold the victim's property.46 The
intentional torts listed here are by no means exhaustive. If a victim dies as a
result of intentional or negligent acts by an abuser, surviving family
members of a victim might have a claim for wrongful death.47 The victim's
estate may also be able to continue any cause of action the victim had
against the abuser as a survival action.4 8
6. Intent for Intentional Torts and Recklessness and Negligence Claims
With the exception of some wrongful death or survival actions, all of the
aforementioned causes of action are intentional torts. Intentional torts
require intent, which occurs when a tortfeasor purposely acts to accomplish
a certain result, or, though not acting with a specific purpose, knows with a
substantial certainty that his or her actions will bring about a certain result. 4 9
Most acts of domestic violence involve sufficient intent to support an
39. VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: LAW AND LITIGATION, supra note 16, § 17:12.
40. See 1 Kan. Law & Prac., Family Law § 8:32.4 (discussing tortious infliction of venereal
disease in Kansas).
41. VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: LAW AND LITIGATION, supra note 16, § 17:21.
42. Id.; William B. Johnson, Annotation, Liability of Legal or Natural Parent, or One Who
Aids and Abets, for Damages Resulting from Abduction of Own Child,49 A.L.R.4th 7 (1986); Joy
M. Feinberg & Lori S. Loeb, Custody and Visitation Interference: Alternative Remedies, 12 J. AM.
ACAD. MATRiM. LAW. 271 (1994); William L. Hill, Note, Tort Recovery for IntentionalInterference
with Visitation Rights: A Necessary Alternative, 32 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 657 (1994); Joseph R.
Hillebrand, Note, ParentalKidnapping and the Tort of CustodialInterference: Not in a Child's Best
Interests, 25 IND. L. REv. 893, 906-13 (1991).
43. Steven M. Pincus & David N. Rosen, Fighting Back: Filing Suit Under the Violence
Against Women Act, TRIAL, Dec. 1997, at 21, 24.
44. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 222A, 229 (1965).
45. See generally id.§ 217 (1965).
46. Pincus & Rosen, supra note 43, at 24.
47. See DOBBS, supra note 2, at 803-05, 807-15.
48. Id. at805-07.
49. Id. at 48; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 1 (2010) ("A person
acts with the intent to produce a consequence if: (a) the person acts with the purpose of producing
that consequence; or (b) the person acts knowing that the consequence is substantially certain to
result.").
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intentional tort claim. Abusers act deliberately and intentionally, opening
the way for victims to file intentional tort claims, as opposed to negligence
actions. Domestic violence perpetrators use intentional acts to exert power
over their partners.50 Their acts are intended "to punish, hurt, or control"
their intimate partner.5 1 Their conduct is purposeful, seeking the compliance
and control of the partner. 52 Abusers have active control of their behavior
and remain mindful and aware of their decisions even while committing
violence. 5 3 For each incident of abuse, domestic violence perpetrators give
themselves permission to become abusive and choose how far to let
themselves go. 5 4 A true loss of control likely would result in much greater
injury, even death, for the victim. 55 An abuser's decision to use violence
against the intimate partner is a choice. When abusers are in conflict with
others-like co-workers or other family members-they do not choose to
use violence against those individuals.56
Abusers are calculated in choosing to abuse, and often incorporate
family privacy into their decisions. The private, isolated nature of the family
provides increased opportunities for abuse that can play into this
calculation.57 There is reduced social control in the private sphere of the
family, and the cost to the perpetrator for abuse to an intimate partner is
often significantly less than the cost of violence to someone outside the
private sphere.58 The perpetrator may also decide that the rewards of
abusing a partner are greater than the potential costs." Tort law assumes
that individuals "stand back and consider the purposes they are attempting to
realize through their acts, compare them with other possible purposes, and
modify or abandon them."60 Abusers engage in such contemplation.
These calculations on the part of an abuser constitute sufficient
culpability for intentional torts but also support torts requiring less

50.
51.
52.

JOHNSON, supra note 20, at 13-17.
STARK,supra note 12, at 205.
Ganley, supra note 11, at 17-18.

53. LUNDY BANCROFT, WHY DOES HE Do THAT?: INSIDE THE MINDS OF ANGRY AND
CONTROLLING MEN 34-37 (2003).

54.
55.

Id. at 339.
Richard J. Gelles, An Exchange/Social Control Theory, in THE DARK SIDE OF FAMILIES:

CURRENT FAMILY VIOLENCE RESEARCH 151, 159 (David Finkelhor et al. eds., 1983).

56. Ganley, supra note 11, at 23.
57. See generally Gelles, supra note 55, at 151-65 (discussing the social costs of violence to
the abuser in the family as opposed to in public).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Ernest J. Weinrib, Understanding Tort Law, 23 VAL. U. L. REv. 485, 516 (1989).
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culpability such as recklessness61 and negligence.62 Claims for recklessness
(sometimes referred to as willful or wanton conduct) arise out of the types of
violence discussed above, usually within the context of battery. Pursuing
claims with lower levels of culpability may allow a plaintiffs case to
proceed if the court fails to find the intent required for intentional torts.
Additionally, pleading a case for negligence may also offer the plaintiff a
better chance of recovery. While intentional tort actions usually are not
covered by insurance policies, negligence actions typically are.63
Domestic violence victims may also be able to file claims for negligent
infliction of emotional distress (NIED). NIED claims are primarily allowed
in two situations: when an individual suffers emotional distress as a result of
fearing for her own safety, 6 and when an individual suffers emotional
distress as a result of witnessing the serious bodily injury of a close family

member. 65 In domestic violence situations, liability for NIED for fearing for
61. A claim for recklessness requires a showing that the defendant
created an unreasonable risk of harm to others and a high degree of risk
harm. RESTATMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 2 (2010).
been conscious of the risk and engaged in the conduct without concern

engaged in conduct that
or a risk of very serious
The defendant must have
for the safety of others.

DOBBS, supra note 2, at 51. Cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM

§ 2 (2010)

("A person acts recklessly in engaging in conduct if: (a) the person knows of the risk of harm created
by the conduct or knows facts that make the risk obvious to another in the person's situation, and (b)
the precaution that would eliminate or reduce the risk involves burdens that are so slight relative to
the magnitude of the risk as to render the person's failure to adopt the precaution a demonstration of
the person's indifference to the risk.").
62. Concurrently pursuing a lesser-included claim of negligence may allow for recovery if the
court finds that the abuser's conduct was not intentional or reckless. To make a claim for
negligence, the plaintiff must show: (1) that the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff; (2)
that the defendant breached that duty through his unreasonable and risky conduct; (3) that the
defendant's conduct caused the plaintiff's harms; (4) that the defendant's conduct was the proximate
cause of the plaintiff's harm, meaning there's a significant relationship between the conduct and the
harm; and, (5) that the plaintiff suffered legally recognized harm. DOBBS, supra note 2, at 269. Cf,
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM

§3

(2010) ("A person acts negligently if

the person does not exercise reasonable care under all the circumstances. Primary factors to consider
in ascertaining whether the person's conduct lacks reasonable care are the foreseeable likelihood that
the person's conduct will result in harm, the foreseeable severity of any harm that may ensue, and
the burden of precautions to eliminate or reduce the risk of harm.").
63. See infra part III.B.5.
64. This claim applies when the defendant's negligent conduct places the plaintiff in danger of
immediate bodily harm and the plaintiff suffers severe emotional distress as a result of that danger.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM

§ 47

(2012) ("An actor whose negligent

conduct causes serious emotional harm to another is subject to liability to the other if the conduct:
(a) places the other in danger of immediate bodily harm and the emotional harm results from the
danger. . . .").
65. This claim, usually referred to as "bystander liability," provides a cause of action when an
individual suffers serious emotional harm as a result of contemporaneously perceiving an event
caused by the negligence of the actor which results in sudden serious bodily injury to a close family
member. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 48 (2012) ("An actor who
negligently causes sudden serious bodily injury to a third person is subject to liability for serious
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one's own safety arises frequently. NIED claims are viable only if the
injuries are solely emotional. If there are physical injuries, the proper tort is
battery, and emotional harm would be compensated as pain and suffering.
While beyond the scope of this paper, it should be noted that children
may be able to pursue tort actions arising from domestic violence incidents.
If a child is abused, the child may be able to file the same or similar common
law claims as those available to domestic violence victims. Children who
are not directly abused but who live in homes where domestic violence is
present may also be able to pursue tort actions. If they witness abuse against
a parent, they could file a negligence, reckless, or IIED claim.66 If they are
injured accidentally incident to an act of domestic violence, they may be
able to pursue negligence, recklessness, or intentional tort claims.
However, many jurisdictions still maintain parental immunity for tort suits
filed by a child against a parent. 6 8
7. Claims Against Third Parties
It is also important to mention the possibility of filing domestic
violence-related tort claims against third parties. Claims are sometimes
available against municipalities and law enforcement agencies for failing to
respond to a report of a restraining order violation or an incident of
violence.69 Tort liability may also arise for third parties who have a "special
relationship" that gives rise to a duty. The special relationship and its
attendant duty can apply to doctors, 70 therapists, and clergy members who
emotional harm caused thereby to a person who: (a) perceives the event contemporaneously, and (b)
is a close family member of the person suffering the bodily injury."). Negligent infliction of
emotional distress claims also arise in the "direct victim" context, usually arising from specific
activities, such as mishandling human remains, or a special relationship between the parties, such as
that between a physician and patient in limited scenarios. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 47 cmt. b (2012) (noting that there can be liability "when an actor
undertakes to perform specified obligations, engages in specified activities, or is in a specified
relationship fraught with the risk of emotional harm"). A third type of NIED claim arises under a
direct victim theory under assumed or independent duty. See DOBBS, supra note 2, at 848-51.
66. Clare Dalton, Domestic Violence, Domestic Torts and Divorce: Constraints and
Possibilities,31 NEW ENG. L. REv. 319, 340 (1997).
67. Id. at 340-41.
68. Romualdo P. Eclavea, Annotation, Liability of Parentfor Injury to UnemancipatedChild
Causedby Parent'sNegligence-Modern Cases, 6 A.L.R.4th 1066, § 3 (198 1).
69. See VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: LAW AND LITIGATION, supra note 16, § 17:18; 2
THOMSON/WEST, DOMESTIC TORTS: FAMILY VIOLENCE, CONFLICT AND SEXUAL ABUSE 26

(Revised ed. 2005).
70. See James T.R. Jones, Battered Spouses' Damage Actions Against Non-Reporting
Physicians,45 DEPAUL L. REv. 191 (1996); James T.R. Jones, Kentucky Tort Liabilityfor Failure to
Report Family Violence, 26 N. KY. L. REV. 43 (1999).
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may have a duty to third parties, here domestic violence victims." Tort
claims also may be pursued against owners and occupiers of land who fail to
protect against the criminal acts of third parties. For instance, landlords may
be liable for domestic violence torts occurring on rental property. 72 i
addition to suing abusers, victims can also bring suit against third parties for
failure to provide reasonable care to protect them from the foreseeable
criminal acts of an abuser.73 This has the potential to enhance the victim's
recovery and encourage third parties to protect victims from harm when they
are able to do so.
B. Violence Against Women Act
Congress acknowledged the importance of tort claims to domestic
violence victims when it passed the Violence Against Women Act of 1994
(VAWA).74 VAWA created a federal civil rights cause of action for the
broader category of gender-motivated violence, which included domestic
violence. This provision of VAWA, or Section 13981, framed the new
claim as protecting the civil rights of victims 75 by protecting the right of all
people to be free of violent crimes motivated by gender.76 To assert a claim
under VAWA, a plaintiff had to show that she was a victim of a "crime of
violence motivated by gender." 7 7 VAWA defined a "crime of violence" as
conduct that would constitute a felony against a person or would constitute a
felony against property if the conduct against the property presented a
serious risk of physical injury to another person and meets the definition of
certain state or federal offenses. To satisfy the requirement that the crime
was motivated by gender, the plaintiff would have to show that the crime
was committed "because of gender or on the basis of gender, and due, at
71. See VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: LAW AND LITIGATION, supra note 16, § 17:18; 2
THOMSON/WEST, supra note 69, at 26-37.
72. Tracy A. Bateman & Susan Thomas, Annotation, Landlord's Liability for Failure to
Protect Tenant from CriminalActs of Third Person, 43 A.L.R.5th 207, § 4(a)-(e) (1996); Corey
Mostafa, Comment, The Implied Warranty ofHabitability,Foreseeability,and Landlord Liability
for Third-PartyCriminalActs Against Tenants, 54 UCLA L. REV. 971 (2007); PREMISES LIABILITY
3d § 41:19 (Louis Lehr ed. 2011).
73.

See VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: LAW AND LITIGATION, supra note 16,

§

17:19 (providing

that "premises liability cases involving violence against women are based on claims of negligent
security or dangerous conditions of the premises").
74. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title IV, 108 Stat. 1796
(codified as amended in various sections of8, 18 and 42 U.S.C. (1994)).
75. Id. § 40302 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994)).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b).
77. §13981(c) & (d)(1).
78. § 13981(d)(2)(A).
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least in part, to an animus based on the victim's gender. . . ."79 Successful

plaintiffs could obtain compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and
declaratory relief, and other relief deemed appropriate by the court presiding
over the immediate case.so
The civil remedy was framed as a civil right for women, allowing
women to vindicate their right to be free from gender-motivated violence.
It was unclear when VAWA passed whether courts would interpret all
domestic violence as a "crime of violence motivated by gender" and how
courts would interpret which acts of domestic violence would constitute a
violent act "because of gender or on the basis of gender" and "due, at least in
part, to an animus based on the victim's gender." 82 While the VAWA civil
rights claim was in effect, the majority of plaintiffs brought intentional tort
claims with the civil rights claim. 83 Court decisions on Section 13981
domestic violence claims that followed VAWA's passage affirmed that
domestic violence cases could fall within the parameters of Section 13981 .84
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court struck down the civil rights remedy
created by VAWA in 2000 in United States v. Morrison.ss The Morrison
Court held that Congress lacked authority under the Commerce Clause to
enact the Section 13981 civil remedy. 86 It found that gender-motivated
violent conduct was noneconomic activity and that Congress's attempt to
regulate that conduct could not sustain a Constitutional challenge based on
the aggregate effect of gender-motivated violence on interstate commerce.
The Court also found that the civil rights remedy could not be upheld on
Equal Protection grounds under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.8 8
79. § 13981(d)(1).
80. § 13981(c).
81. S. Rep. No. 103-138, at 44 (1993); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 103-711, at 385-86 (1994).
82. Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love ": Wife Beating as Prerogativeand Privacy, 105 YALE
L.J. 2117, 2199-201 (1996).
83. Jennifer Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 121, 132 n.57 (2001)
[hereinafter Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts] (reviewing the seventy-three reported VAWA
decisions and finding that fifty-one of the decisions included an intentional tort claim).
84. Julie Goldscheid & Risa E. Kaufman, Seeking Redress for Gender-Based BiascrimesCharting New Ground in Familiar Legal Territory, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 265, 273-83 (2001)
(analyzing cases that interpreted when an act of violence was "gender-motivated" rather than
"random"). See, e.g., Culberson v. Doan, 65 F. Supp. 2d 701 (S.D. Ohio 1999); Seaton v. Seaton,
971 F. Supp. 1188 (E.D. Tenn. 1997); Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996). See also Julie
Goldscheid, Gender-Motivated Violence: Developing a Meaningful Paradigmfor Civil Rights
Enforcement, 22 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 123, 145-58 (1999).
85. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
86. Id. at 613.
87. Id. at 613, 617-19.
88. Id. at 619-27.

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE TORTS

2014]

709

The Court rejected the argument that Congress could enact a private civil
rights claim to remedy states' pervasive bias against victims of gendermotivated violence in state justice systems.89 The Court held that
Congress's power under Section 5 to enact legislation to guarantee that no
state shall deprive any person of "life, liberty or property, without due
process of law," nor deny any person "equal protection of the laws," did not
empower it to create a Section 13981 claim against a private individual, as
the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to state action, and not to "merely
private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful." 90
C. State and Local Claimsfor Domestic and Gender-Motivated Violence
While still extremely rare, several states and one municipality have
developed specific tort claims that apply to domestic violence victims, either
statutorily or through common law. Some of these claims mirror the now
extinct VAWA civil remedy. New Jersey and Washington recognize the tort
of battered women's syndrome; New York City, Illinois, and California
acknowledge gender-motivated violence claims; and California has enacted
a specific tort of domestic violence. Each is addressed in turn. While not
specifically discussed here, it is important to note that many jurisdictions
also have hate crime statutes that create civil liability for gender-based bias
-91
crimes.
1. New Jersey
A New Jersey trial court allowed recovery under a novel civil domestic
violence claim called "battered woman's syndrome." In Cusseaux v.
Pickett,92 the plaintiff, Jean Marie Cusseaux, brought a civil tort claim for
"battered-woman's syndrome" against her intimate partner, Wilson Pickett,
Jr., with whom she had lived for about ten years. 9 3 The plaintiff alleged that
the defendant engaged in a continuous course of abuse and violence,
including hitting her with his fists on repeated occasions, breaking her nose,
hitting her with a heavy kitchen pot, and striking her with a large
89.
90.

Id. at 625-27.
U.S. CONST. amend. XVI,

§§

1, 5; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 621 (citing Shelley v. Kraemer,

334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948)).
91. See, e.g., 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 82/10 (West 2013); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 61 1A.79
(West 2013); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-113 (West 2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-21 (West 2013);
D.C. CODE § 22-3704 (2013).
92. 652 A.2d 789 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1995).
93. Id. at 789.
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corningware dish.94 The Cusseaux court held that the plaintiff had a
cognizable claim for battered-woman's syndrome and in doing so, created a
unique domestic violence tort claim in the State of New Jersey. 95 The court
established that the elements of such a claim are:
1) involvement in a marital or marital-like relationship; and 2) physical
or psychological abuse perpetrated by the dominant partner. . . over an
extended period of time; and 3) the aforestated abuse has caused
recurring physical or psychological injury over the course of the
relationship; and 4) a past or present inability [on the part of the victim]
to take any action to improve or alter the situation unilaterally. 96
The court used many of the arguments related to the use of battered
women's syndrome as a defense in criminal cases9 in allowing a similarly
named affirmative civil cause of action.98 Battered woman's syndrome as an
affirmative tort claim was affirmed by the Appellate Division of the New
Jersey Superior Court in the case of Giovine v. Giovine.9 9
2. Washington
Washington State also acknowledges a tort called "battered woman
syndrome." A Washington State Superior Court allowed recovery in a
"battered woman syndrome" case. 00 In Jewett v. Jewett, the plaintiff
Theresa Jewett filed an action for assault, battery, battered woman
syndrome, IED, and outrage-as well as claims for deceit/bigamy,
negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract of marriage, abuse of civil
legal process, and wrongful initiation of civil proceedings.' 0 Jewett alleged
that the defendant Michael Jewett engaged in a calculated pattern of
pervasive and ongoing severe emotional and physical abuse after the parties'
94. Id. at 789-90 n.l.
95. Id. at 793.
96. Id. at 793-94.
97. See State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1984) (discussing battered women's
syndrome as grounds for a self defense claim in a homicide case).
98. Cusseaux, 652 A.2d at 791-92, 794.
99. 663 A.2d 109, 114, 123-24 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) (affirming the elements of
battered woman's syndrome enumerated in Cusseaux v. Pickett but clarifying that underlying
abusive acts in a battered woman's syndrome claim must fall within the standard statute of
limitations), overruledon othergrounds by Kinsella v. Kinsella, 696 A.2d 556 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1997).
100. Jewett v. Jewett, No. 93-2-01846-5 (Wash. Super. Ct. Spokane Cnty. 1993).
101. Verified Complaint For Damages at 7-10, Jewett v. Jewett, No. 93-2-01846-5 (Wash.
Super. Ct. Spokane Cnty. 1993); First Amended Complaint For Damages at 7-12, Jewett v. Jewett,
No. 93-2-01846-5 (Wash. Super. Ct. Spokane Cnty. 1993); Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint
For Damages at 7-13, Jewett v. Jewett, No. 93-2-01846-5 (Wash. Super. Ct. Spokane Cnty. 1994).

2014]

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE TORTS

711

marriage.102 On one occasion, in retaliation for the plaintiff calling the
police, the defendant hyperextended the plaintiffs head, resulting in
permanent neck and upper back damage. 0 3 On another occasion, the
defendant threw the plaintiff down against a coffee table and then repeatedly
hit her in the face until she lost consciousness.'
The injuries were so
severe that the plaintiff required reconstructive surgery to reposition her
cheekbone.' 05 These are just a few of the violent episodes set forth in the
plaintiffs complaint.
The trial court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiffs
battered woman syndrome claim.106 The court took judicial notice of the
"extreme form of dependence" that many domestic violence victims
experience.107 It noted:
[The parties'] interaction encourages not only the continuance of the
relationship but also the violence within it. Once caught in the cycle,
traditional remedies under the law, including the right to file civil

actions for assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress (outrage), for all practical purposes are not available because
the statutes of limitations prevent the victim from fully asserting her
rights. 108
The court articulated the elements of this new tort of battered woman
syndrome as follows:
(1) a pattern of volitional acts, which include physical acts and
gestures, as well as statements, threats, or verbal utterances; (2) which
is reasonably calculated to create fear or anxiety or to establish
perceptions of fear or anxiety for the victim's self or family; (3) that is
continuous in nature, and, occurs over a period of time; (4) that could
reasonably have been foreseen to, and that in fact did cause; (5)
physical injury, emotional distress, or a state of emotional dependency

that renders a victim unable to effectively maintain an action against

102. Verified Complaint For Damages at 2, Jewett v. Jewett, No. 93-2-01846-5 (Wash. Super.
Ct. Spokane Cnty. 1994).
103. Id. at 2-3.
104. Id. at 4.
105. Id.
106. Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Petition for Battered Women's Syndrome
Pursuant to CR 12(b)(6) at 4, Jewett v. Jewett, No. 93-2-01846-5 (Wash. Super. Ct. Spokane Cnty.
1994).
107. Id. at 1.
108. Id.
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her abuser. 109
The plaintiff Theresa Jewett was granted a default judgment on her
claims, including the battered woman syndrome claim.1 0 She was awarded
The judgment was
$127,316 in damages through a stipulated judgment.'
paid by the defendant's estate because the defendant died of a heart attack in
Costa Rica during the pendency of litigation.112
D. City and State Statutory Developments
The Jewett court's decision to recognize this novel claim was, as in the
New Jersey case of Cusseaux v. Pickett, a progressive and important step in
the development of domestic violence tort law. Other jurisdictions have
taken a different approach by creating gender-motivated violence claims,
similar to the now defunct civil remedy provision of VAWA. New York
City, Illinois, and California have adopted gender-motivated violence laws
that cover but are not limited to injuries arising from domestic violence.
1. New York City
New York City enacted a provision addressing domestic violence
entitled the Victims of Gender-Motivated Violence Protection Act." The
provision, contained in the Civil Rights section of the Administrative Code,
provides a private right of action to victims of gender-motivated violence
against their perpetrators.1 4 To succeed under such a claim, a victim must
show that she was a victim of a "crime of violence" and that the crime of
violence was "motivated by gender."" 15 The code defines a "crime of

109. Id. at 3. See also Brief Amicus Curiae of Spokane Legal Servs. at 19-20, Jewett v. Jewett,
No. 93-2-01846-5 (Wash. Super. Ct. Spokane Cnty. 1994) (providing that the tort of "domestic
violence," i.e. battered women syndrome, is defined by these five elements).
110. Stipulated Judgment on Default, Jewett v. Jewett, No. 93-2-01846-5 (Wash. Super. Ct.
Spokane Cnty. 1996). The defendant's motion to vacte the judgment was denied. Order Denying
Defendant's Motion to Vacate Order and Judgment, Jewett v. Jewett, No. 93-2-01846-5 (Wash.
Super. Ct. Spokane Cnty. 1996).
111. Stipulated Judgment on Default at 2, Jewett v. Jewett, No. 93-2-01846-5 (Wash. Super. Ct.
Spokane Cnty. 1996).
112. Jim Lynch, Woman Wins Abuse Lawsuit Jewett to Receive 5125,000from DeadSpouse's
Estate,
THE
SPOKESMAN
REVIEW
(Jan.
6,
1996),
http://www.spokesman.com/stories/1 996/jan/06/woman-wins-abuse-lawsuit-jewett-to-receive125000/.
113. NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE §§ 8-901 to 8-907 (2000).
114. Id. § 8-902.
115. Id. §§ 8-903,904.
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violence" as "an act or series of acts that would constitute a misdemeanor or
felony against the person" or "against property as defined in state or federal
law if the conduct presents a serious risk of physical injury to another,
whether or not those acts have actually resulted in criminal charges,
prosecution, or conviction."116
The law defines "crime of violence
motivated by gender" as "a crime of violence committed because of gender
or on the basis of gender, and due, at least in part, to an animus based on the
victim's gender."" 7 Upon successfully showing these two elements, victims
can seek "compensatory and punitive damages," "injunctive and declaratory
relief," "attorneys' fees and costs," and "other relief as a court may deem
appropriate."" 8
New York City's Gender-Motivated Violence Protection Act is not
tailored to address intimate partner violence exclusively but certainly
encompasses it. Domestic violence cases fit squarely within the parameters
set forth by New York City's Gender-Motivated Violence Protection Act.
The law's Declaration of Legislative Findings and Intent makes repeated
reference to the findings and intent of Congress in passing the federal
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA),'9 including Congress's intention
to aid domestic violence victims through VAWA's federal civil remedy.
The Committee Report supporting passage of the Act also makes repeated
reference to domestic violence.12 0
Before passing the bill, the New York City Council heard testimony
positing that a claim for gender-motivated violence would provide a muchneeded remedy for domestic violence victims. This testimony stated that
"[c]urrently there are no legal remedies that provide meaningful economic
relief to victims of gender-based domestic violence in New York City for the

116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. § 8-903.
Id.
Id. § 8-904.
Id. § 8-902.

120.

COMM. ON GEN. WELFARE JOINTLY WITH THE COMM. ON WOMEN'S ISSUES, CoMM. REP.

2000),
available
at
No.
752-A
(Nov.
30,
ON
PROPOSED
INT.
http://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=434516&GUID-CE9AlFl4-B559-470AAB90-40FE9754385C ("The pervasiveness of domestic violence is well documented. According to
the Mayor's Management Report for Fiscal 2000, the Police Department made 23,935 family-related
arrests for the year and there were 4,012 arrests for violations of orders of protection. Further, the
police filed 252,902 domestic incident reports in fiscal 2000. (Advocates believe that since many
domestic violence incidents are not reported, this figure does not reflect the true immensity of the
domestic violence problem in New York City). During fiscal 1999, the Police Department reported
87 domestic violence-related homicides. However, as is noted in the legislative findings, various
task forces and the United States Department of Justice have found a climate of hostility in court
systems towards sexual assault and domestic violence claims.").
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injuries they incur as a result of domestic violence."l 2 1 All voting members
of the City Council unanimously passed the Act on December 5, 2000, and
the mayor signed the law into effect on December 19, 2000.122
The only published decision related to New York City's GenderMotivated Violence Protection Act is Cadiz-Jones v. Zambetti,123 which is
based on intimate partner violence. In Cadiz-Jones, Ms. Cadiz-Jones sued
her former fiancd Mr. Zambetti for physical abuse under a number of claims,
including a gender-motivated violence claim under the Act.124 The main
issue in the case was whether Ms. Cadiz-Jones's gender-motivated violence
claim was barred by the statute of limitations or whether it was still valid
because the Act applied retroactively.' 25
The Cadiz-Jones court clearly acknowledged that domestic violence fits
within the cause of action provided by the Act. The court did not address
whether domestic violence constitutes gender-motivated violence. Instead,
it launched into the primary issues of the case, namely matters related to the
statute of limitations and retroactivity. In its decision, the Cadiz-Jones court
stated, "It is evident that the City Council's intent was to fill the gap as soon
as Morrison was decided by restoring the availability of a private remedy for
domestic violence victims in New York City. . . ."126 The court 27
specified
that the Act does not create a "distinct 'tort of domestic violence."'l
2. Illinois
Illinois also provides an avenue for domestic violence tort relief through
its Gender Violence Act. 128 While not limited to domestic violence, the
Gender Violence Act is sufficiently broad to encompass domestic violence
as well as other forms of gender-motivated violence and was drafted with

121. Cadiz-Jones v. Zambretti, No. 123772/00,2002 WL 34697795, at *6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 9,
2002).
122. Cadiz-Jones, 2002 WL 34697795, at *7. Nearby Westchester County quickly followed
New York City's lead when it established the Victims of Gender-Motivated Violence Protection Act.
WESTCHESTER COUNTY, NY, LAWS OF WESTCHESTER COUNTY ch. 701 (2001). Nearby Rockland
County also followed suit. ROCKLAND COUNTY, NY, LAWS OF ROCKLAND COUNTY ch. 279 (2001).

123. Cadiz-Jones,2002 WL 34697795. But cf Cordero v. Epstein, 869 N.Y.S.2d 725, 730-31
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008) (dismissing a Gender-Motivated Violence Protection Act claim for sexual
contact with a minor because the statute of limitations had run and there was no showing that the
defendant had "demonstrated any hostility based on gender").
124. Cadiz-Jones, 2002 WL 34697795, at *2-3.
125. Id. at *3-8.
126. Id. at *7.
127. Id. at *8.
128. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 82 / 1-20 (West 2013).
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domestic violence in mind. The Preamble to the Bill frames the proposed
Act as one targeting domestic violence and sexual abuse. It states that
studies have shown that "gender-related violence such as domestic violence,
which is disproportionately visited upon women by men, ... [h]arms many
women and children without being reported or prosecuted."l 29 The Preamble
goes on to say that "[i]t is documented that existing State and federal laws
have not provided adequate remedies to women survivors of domestic
violence."o30 Then it states that "[w]omen survivors of domestic violence
oftentimes have found laws against domestic violence used against them by
their batterers."' 3 1 With the bill so explicitly couched in terms of domestic
violence, the Illinois legislature clearly meant for the Act to provide an
avenue of tort relief for domestic violence victims. The Act states that
gender-motivated violence, including domestic violence, is a form of sex
discrimination that the Act seeks to remedy.132
The Illinois Act ties its definition of gender-related violence to the
state's criminal definition of battery, defining "gender-related violence" as:
(1) One or more acts of violence or physical aggression satisfying the
elements of battery under the laws of Illinois that are committed, at
least in part, on the basis of a person's sex, whether or not those acts
have resulted in criminal charges, prosecution, or conviction[; or] (2)
[a] physical intrusion or physical invasion of a sexual nature under
coercive conditions satisfying the elements of battery under the laws of
Illinois, whether or not the act or acts resulted in criminal charges,
prosecution, or conviction[; or] (3) [a] threat of an act described in item
(1) or (2) causing a realistic apprehension that the originator of the
threat will commit the act.133
The Illinois Gender Violence Act provides that victims of gendermotivated violence may seek "injunctive relief, . . . actual damages, damages
for emotional distress, or punitive damages," as well as "attorney's fees and
costs" and "other appropriate relief."l 34
3. California
California has established both a civil action for gender-motivated
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

2003 ELL. Legis. Serv. P.A. 93-416 (West).
Id.
Id.
Id.
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 82 / 5 (West 2013).

134.

740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 82 / 15 (West 2013).
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violence and a specific domestic violence tort. 135 The California gendermotivated violence claim, known as the "[c]ivil action for damages arising
from gender violence," largely mirrors the requirements of the Illinois
Gender Violence Act.'
The California domestic violence tort claim,
known as the "tort of domestic violence," provides civil relief specifically
tailored to domestic violence as opposed to the broader category of gender
violence.137 California Civil Code Section 1708.6 provides that a person is
liable for the tort of domestic violence if "(1) [t]he infliction of injury upon
the plaintiff result[s] from abuse," and "(2) [t]he abuse was committed by . .
. a person having a relationship with the plaintiff as defined" by the
statute. 38 "Abuse" as required in the first element includes "intentionally or
recklessly causing or attempting to cause bodily injury, or placing another
person in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to
himself or herself, or another."' 39 The relationship required for tort liability
can be that of a "spouse, former spouse, cohabitant, former cohabitant, or
person with whom the suspect has had a child or is having or has had a
dating or engagement relationship." 40
Under the California statute, a domestic violence tort plaintiff may
recover "general damages, special damages, and punitive damages."
In
these cases, courts are also authorized to grant "equitable relief, an
injunction, costs, and any other relief that the court deems proper, including

135. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 52.4,1708.6 (West 2011).
136. Cy. § 52.4. Section 52.4 provides in relevant part: "(a) Any person who has been
subjected to gender violence may bring a civil action for damages against any responsible party. The
plaintiff may seek actual damages, compensatory damages, punitive damages, injunctive relief, any
combination of those, or any other appropriate relief. A prevailing plaintiff may also be awarded
attorney's fees and costs. (b) An action brought pursuant to this section shall be commenced within
three years of the act, or if the victim was a minor when the act occurred, within eight years after the
date the plaintiff attains the age of majority or within three years after the date the plaintiff discovers
or reasonably should have discovered the psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of
majority that was caused by the act, whichever date occurs later. (c) For purposes of this section,
"gender violence," is a form of sex discrimination and means any of the following: (1) One or more
acts that would constitute a criminal offense under state law that has as an element the use, attempted
use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, committed at least
in part based on the gender of the victim, whether or not those acts have resulted in criminal
complaints, charges, prosecution, or conviction[; or] (2) A physical intrusion or physical invasion of
a sexual nature under coercive conditions, whether or not those acts have resulted in criminal
complaints, charges, prosecution, or conviction." Id.
137. Civ. § 1708.6.
138. Civ. § 1708.6(a).
139. CAL. PENAL CODE § 13700(a) (West 2005).
140. Id. § 13700(b).
141. Crv. § 1708.6(b)
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reasonable attorney's fees."l 42 The California legislature recognized the
importance of tort recovery for domestic violence victims. Its findings
include that "[t]hese acts merit special consideration as torts, because the
elements of trust, physical proximity, and emotional intimacy necessary to
domestic relationships in a healthy society makes participants in those
43
relationships particularly vulnerable to physical attack by their partners."'1
The California courts have supported domestic violence tort claims,'" and
the California legislature has created a special statute of limitations for
domestic violence plaintiffs.1 45
These state and local causes of action, which aim to provide meaningful
civil remedies to domestic violence victims, are good foundational efforts in
the area of domestic violence torts. While this paper argues for the use of
existing tort remedies, domestic violence specific tort claims could provide
victims with even greater recovery.146 Under such claims, courts could
142. CIV. § 1708.6(c).
143. 2002 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 193 § 1(b) (West). The legislature also found that "acts of
violence occurring in a domestic context [were] increasingly widespread," and, "[t]he purpose of this
act [was] to enhance the civil remedies available to victims of domestic violence in order to
underscore society's condemnation of these acts, to ensure complete recovery to victims, and to
impose significant financial consequences upon perpetrators." Id § 1(a), (c).
144. See Cheng v. Casas, No. H034352, 2011 WL 882995 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2011)
(unpublished decision) (affirming trial court's order awarding terminating sanctions against plaintiff
in action for tort of domestic violence and other claims for negligence and intentional torts arising
from domestic violence); Boblitt v. Boblitt, 118 Cal. Rptr. 3d 788 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)
(reversing and remanding to allow plaintiff to proceed on her tort of domestic violence claim that
was dismissed pursuant to a motion for summary judgment in a divorce proceeding); Pugliese v.
Superior Court, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 681 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (finding that domestic violence
plaintiffs, including tort of domestic violence plaintiffs, are entitled to seek recovery for all acts of
domestic abuse occurring during the domestic relationship so long as the litigant proves a continuing
course of abusive conduct); Deal v. Deal, No. A105221, 2005 WL 388725 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. Feb.
18, 2005) (unpublished decision) (finding that plaintiffs child abduction allegations do not
constitute a claim under the tort of domestic violence statute).
145. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §340.15 (West 2011).
146. See generally Rhonda L. Kohler, The Battered Women and Tort Law: A New Approach to
Fighting Domestic Violence, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1025, 1031 (1992) (arguing that "the courts and
legislatures should recognize a new tort of spousal abuse which would facilitate compensating
women for mental and physical injuries inflicted by battering domestic partners"). Kohler offers
guidance to courts and legislatures in creating and recognizing domestic violence tort claims,
recommending that courts recognize a continuing tort of spousal abuse using the following elements:
"(1) intentional acts; (2) of extreme and outrageous conduct; (3) of a continuous nature; (4)
proximately causing; (5) physical injury or emotional distress." Id. at 1068. See also Sarah M. Buel,
Access to Meaningfil Remedy: Overcoming DoctrinalObstacles in Tort LitigationAgainst Domestic
Violence Offenders, 83 OR. L. REv. 945, 1019-25 (2004) (arguing for recognition of a domestic
violence tort and describing the benefits of a specially designated domestic violence tort); Dalton,
supra note 66, at 344-46 (proposing a new tort of "partner abuse," incorporating "the entire history
of combined physical and emotional abuse [into] a single claim"); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Sex,
Lies, andDissipation: The DiscourseofFault in a No-FaultEra, 82 GEO. L.J. 2525, 2566-67 (1994)
(proposing a new "claim for marital tort or breach of spousal trust," providing recovery for
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compensate for emotional abuse that might not otherwise clearly be tortious
and consider claims within the context of the emotional and physical abuse
throughout the relationship. Some statute of limitations issues also may be
alleviated by specific domestic violence tort claims that allow courts to
examine long histories of abuse. States and municipalities should carefully
craft statutes creating domestic violence tort causes of action, and courts
should recognize common law claims for domestic violence similar to the
battered woman's syndrome claim acknowledged by the New Jersey and
Washington courts.14 7 Lawyers and plaintiffs should continue to bring novel
claims for domestic violence torts to move this area of law forward. 14 8
III. REASONS FOR AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SCARCITY OF
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE TORT CLAIMS
A. Scarcity of Claims
Domestic violence tort claims represent a negligible percentage of all
legal actions. Unfortunately there are no current studies as to the percentage
of intentional tort cases involving intimate partners as opposing parties.
Research results published in 1992 revealed a true dearth of intentional tort
claims between intimate partners. 149 Only fifty-three of 2600 state battery or
assault cases that were reported between 1981 and 1990 were between adult
parties in a domestic relationship. 50 Just four such cases in federal court
during the same time period were "between adult parties in a domestic
relationship." 5 1 Only eighteen of more than 6,000 reported intentional
infliction of emotional distress claims in state and federal courts between

"physical, emotional, and economic injuries flowing from a spouse's misconduct," and
acknowledging "a person's right to be free from egregious conduct related to sex and gender and to
abuse of power in the home"); Melissa J. Peila, Note, The Role of Appellate Courts in Domestic
Violence Cases and the Prospect ofa New PartnerAbuse Cause ofAction, 20 REV. LITIG. 503, 52326 (2001) (proposing that state appellate courts adopt a cause of action for "partner abuse" which
would "permit the victim to recover for all injuries occurring [throughout] the battering
relationship").
147. See generally Anita Bernstein, How to Make a New Tort: Three Paradoxes, 75 TEx. L.
REV. 1539 (1997) (discussing the successful creation of new torts generally).
148. See, e.g., Ziegler v. Ziegler, 28 F. Supp. 2d 601, 619 (E.D. Wash. 1998) (discussing
whether the tort of domestic violence exists as a cause of action).
149. Douglas D. Scherer, Tort Remedies for Victims of Domestic Abuse, 43 S.C. L. REV. 543,
565 & n.155 (1992) ("Among approximately 2600 reported state cases of battery, assault, or both,
from 1981 through 1990, only fifty-three involved adult parties in domestic relationships.").
150. Id.
151. Id. at565.
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1958 and 1990 were based on facts indicating domestic violence.152 This
means that only 0.3% of all intentional infliction of emotional distress cases
studied arose from domestic violence incidents. In 2003, Professor Jennifer
Wriggins conducted a Westlaw search attempting to quantify the number of
domestic violence tort cases.' 53 Wriggins searched "in the Westlaw
ALLCASES database for cases containing the words domestic violence and
assault, battery, or intentionalinfliction of emotional distress."'54 Out of the
6,138 citations she retrieved, only thirty-four cases involved intimate
partners or former intimate partners in a domestic violence relationship.155
Some of these cases were independent tort claims, and some were added as
counterclaims in divorce actions. s5 Wriggins also searched the Civil Justice
database of the National Crime Victim Bar Association, "which includes
over 11,000 cases," and "found no domestic violence tort cases."' 57 Given
the prevalence of domestic violence, these statistics reveal that domestic
violence tort remedies have been very rarely pursued.
A look at historical developments in common law, combined with
current policy restrictions in insurance coverage, reveals an environment
inhospitable to domestic violence torts.

152. Id
153. Jennifer B. Wriggins, Domestic Violence in the First-Year Torts Curriculum, 54 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 511, 512-13 (2004) [hereinafter Wriggins, First-Year Torts] ("Recent searches in the
Westlaw ALLCASES database for cases containing the words domestic violence and assault,
battery, or intentionalinfliction ofemotional distress, retrieved a total of 6,138 citations, but only 34
cases that contained tort claims arising from domestic violence in an intimate or formerly intimate
relationship."); Jennifer B.Wriggins, Toward a Feminist Revision of Torts, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER
SOC. POL'Y & L. 139, 155 (2005) [hereinafter Wriggins, Feminist Revision ofTorts].
154. Wriggins, First-YearTorts, supra note 153, at 512-13.
155. Id.
156. Id at 513 n.8. Note eight provides: "Specifically, the search (July 30, 2003) for cases
containing the words domestic violence and assault retrieved 4,408 citations, going back to 1961.
Only 22 contained tort claims arising from domestic violence in an intimate or formerly intimate
relationship. The search (July 31, 2003) for cases containing the words domestic violence and
battery retrieved 1,598 citations, 25 of which contained such tort claims. Of those 25, 18 overlapped
with cases retrieved with the domestic violence and assault search, so there was a total of 29 separate
cases between the two searches. Similarly, the search (June 12, 2003) for cases mentioning domestic
violence and intentional infliction ofemotional distress retrieved 132 cases going back to 1982, only
13 of which dealt with the sort of claims I was seeking. Eight of these overlapped with cases in the
other categories; in other words, there were 5 cases that did not fall in another category. Thus, the
three searches turned up a total of 34 cases. Some of the 34 cases dealt with tort claims brought as
counterclaims in a divorce, and some dealt with tort claims independent of divorces. The overall
figure of 6,138 citations includes cases that appear in more than one category. These searches
revealed thousands of criminal prosecutions pertaining to domestic violence." Id
157. Id at 513.
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B. Chastisement,Coverture, Spousal Immunity, Courts, and Insurance
Historical and current forces in common law and insurance have
conspired to prevent the development of domestic violence tort law. Under
common law, the right of chastisement, the doctrine of coverture, spousal
immunity, and courts' underhanded refusal to acknowledge the abrogation
of spousal immunity have barred domestic violence tort claims.
Additionally, insurance companies' current policy exclusions deny
meaningful recovery to many domestic violence plaintiffs. Each of these
factors contributing to the dearth of domestic violence tort claims will be
examined.
1. Chastisement
Common law historically has fostered domestic violence. Early
common law shielded perpetrators of domestic violence from civil liability
for their tortious acts, especially abuse perpetrated against spouses. The
doctrines of chastisement and coverture not only prevented women from
pursuing civil claims against their husbands for abuse but also allowed and
encouraged domestic violence in marriage. Specifically, men could beat,
rape, or otherwise harm their wives, and the law protected this conduct.
The doctrine of chastisement granted men permission to engage in
violent conduct toward their wives that today would constitute the
underlying acts of domestic violence torts. Chastisement specifically
permitted husbands to physically discipline or provide "correction" to their
wives.
This was justified because:
[A]s he is to answer for her misbehaviour, the law thought it reasonable
to entrust him with this power of restraining her, by domestic
chastisement, in the same moderation that a man is allowed to correct
his servants or children for whom the master or parent is also liable in
some cases to answer.
Under the right of chastisement, the husband could legally "chastise" his
wife-or subject her to physical punishment-if she was not obedient to her
husband or had otherwise engaged in "misbehavior."' 60 The right of
chastisement was limited to "reasonable bounds," and husbands were
158.

1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 444 (1771).

159. Id.
160. Siegel, supra note 82, at 2123; see generally id. at 2121-30 (detailing the right of
chastisement).
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allowed to use violence against their wives so long as the right to do so
lawfully and reasonably belonged to the husband for the correction of his
wife. 6 1 The civil law permitted husbands the power to beat their wives
severely with scourges and sticks in some situations and to use moderate
chastisement in others. 162
In the United States, the right of chastisement stopped being recognized
in the 1870s.163 Several cases explicitly rejected the right of chastisement.
In 1871, the Alabama Supreme Court in Fulgham v. State rejected a
husband's right to chastise his wife.'1" The Alabama court held that "the
privilege ... to beat her with a stick, to pull her hair, choke her, spit in her
face or kick her about the floor, or to inflict upon her like indignities, is not
now acknowledged by our law."6' The Massachusetts Supreme Court also
rejected chastisement that same year in Commonwealth v. McAfee.166 In
McAfee, the wife died as a result of severe domestic violence committed by
her husband.167 The husband requested that the jury be instructed that he
"had a legal right to administer due and proper correction and corporeal
chastisement on his wife."168 The judge refused to offer this instruction and
instead instructed the jury that if the defendant's "unlawful blows" caused
the wife's death, the jury should find the defendant guilty. 169 The jury found
the defendant guilty of manslaughter.170
2. Coverture
The doctrine of coverture also has severely stunted the development of
domestic violence tort law. Coverture, rooted in the French covert-baron,
meant that a married woman was "under the protection and influence of her
husband, her baron, or lord."'71 Under the law of coverture, once married, a
"husband and wife are one person in law," 72 as "the very being or legal
161. 1 BLACKSTONE, supranote 158, at 444.
162. Id. at 445.
163. Siegel, supra note 82, at 2129; see generally id. at 2122-41 (providing an in-depth
discussion of chastisement, including chastisement in the U.S.).
164. Fulgham v. State, 46 Ala. 143 (1871).
165. Id. at 146-47.
166. 108 Mass. 458 (1871).
167. Id. at 458-59.
168. Id. at 459.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 460.
171. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 158, at 442.
172.

Id

See also 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 433

("It being held that they are one person in law.").
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existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is
incorporated and consolidated into that of husband, under whose wing,
protection, and cover, she performs every thing [sic]."73 The unity of the
two was almost total, and a husband could not convey any property to or
enter into any contract with his wife, as this "would be to suppose her
separate existence," since "to covenant with her, would be only to covenant
with himself."1 74 A husband acquired the rights to and possession of a
wife's personal and real property under the notion of the unity of person
between husband and wife.s75
The same concept of unity was applied to a wife's ability to bring an
independent personal injury action. The law dictated that "[i]f the wife be
injured in her person, or her property, she can bring no action for redress
without her husband's concurrence, and in his name, as well as her own."l 76
Similarly, a wife could not be independently sued.17 7 Under the doctrine of
coverture, neither the husband nor the wife could maintain a tort action
against the other.
Historically, "at common law the husband and wife
were one, and the husband was that one."1
If a wife were to sue her
husband for a domestic violence tort, the husband would have been joined as
a plaintiff against himself and he would have received the recovery.'so
Thus, under coverture, husbands committing abusive acts were protected
from civil liability.
The common law principle of coverture made its way from England to
early America, in large part through Blackstone's Commentaries on English
law. Early American judges, lawyers, and lawmakers upheld the principle
American treatise writers
of unity under coverture as an ideal concept.'
"parroted" Blackstone, and coverture became the general rule.' 82

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 158, at 442.
Id
2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 172, at 433-35.
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 158, at 443.
Id.
KEETON ET AL., supra note 18, at 901-02.
Id. at 902; WILLIAM PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 859-64 (4th ed. 1971).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895F cmt. b (1979); PROSSER, supra note 179, at

860.
181. MARYLYNN SALMON, WOMEN AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY INEARLY AMERICA 14 (1986).
182. HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 116-17 (2000). See
generally id. at 93-135 (discussing the law and tradition surrounding wives in early America); id. at
11-23 (describing the great variation in early American law based on individual colony and state
approaches to regulation of marriage). See also SALMON, supra note 181, at 14 (noting that
coverture-i.e. "unity of person"-as advertised by Blackstone, though often revised, was never

abandoned).
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Coverture remained the norm until states began enacting Married
Women's Property Acts around 1844. These Acts, which were also called
Married Women's Acts or Emancipation Acts, were passed in all
jurisdictions in the U.S.184 They were designed to provide married women
with a separate legal identity and a right to hold their own property.
These statutes to some extent gave married women a legal identity separate
from their husbands. They permitted married women to sue and be sued
without joining the husband as a party, to have separate ownership and
control of their own property, and to be responsible for their own torts.' 86
They permitted married women to "maintain an action in her own name, for
damages, against any person ... for any injury to her person or character,
the same as if she were sole."' 87
Courts limited married women's new rights to sue when it involved their
husbands, however. Under Married Women's Property Acts, courts
generally allowed wives to sue their husbands for torts arising from property
interests.188 That is, a married woman could sue her husband for conversion,
detention of chattels, fraud, trespass to land, waste, negligent damage to
property, ejectment, or unlawful detainer.189 Most courts, however, refused
to interpret the new Acts as allowing a married woman to sue her husband
for torts arising from injury to the person.1 90 Instead, courts maintained de
facto coverture for assault, battery, false imprisonment, malicious
prosecution, defamation, and negligence claims by married women against
their husbands. 19 1 Courts rejected these claims even if the tortious conduct
occurred "before the marriage . . . or where the [suit] brought after the

marriage ... was terminated by separation, divorce,.. . annulment, . . . or
death." 92
Courts developed new rationales for refusing to recognize claims,1 93
183.

KEETON ET AL., supra note 18, at 902.

184. PROSSER, supra note 179, at 861.
185. Id.
186. Id.; KEETON ET AL., supranote 18, at 902.
187. Carl Tobias, Interspousal Tort Immunity in America, 23 GA. L. REv. 359, 373 (1989)
(quoting Freethy v. Freethy, 42 Barb. 641, 642 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1865)) (based on an 1862 New
York statute that was typical of most "Married Women" statutes at the time).
188. PROSSER, supra note 179, at 861 (citations omitted).
189. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895F cmt. c (1979); PROSSER, supra note 179, at 861
(citations omitted).
190. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895F cmt. c (1979); PROSSER, supra note 179, at
861-62.
191. PROSSER, supra note 179, at 862 (citations omitted).
192. Id.
193. See LEO KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW: THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 77 (1969)
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propounding a number of justifications for prohibiting suits between spouses
for personal injury. 194 A primary reason cited was that a tort suit would
destroy the peace and harmony of the home and the marital relationship.195
Courts also reasoned that the availability of these suits would induce spouses
to file fraudulent claims.1 9 6 Another justification was that courts would be
burdened by excessive or trivial claims.' 97
3. Spousal Immunity
Thus, despite the Married Women's Property Acts, coverture lived on in
tort law as the common law doctrine of spousal immunity.'9 Spousal
immunity was first recognized in the U.S. in the 1860s, with courts
unanimously upholding the doctrine until 1913.'99 In 1910, a split U.S.
Supreme Court affirmed immunity between spouses for personal injury
claims in Thompson v. Thompson.200 From 1914 to 1920, all but seven
201
From 1921 to 1940,
jurisdictions recognized spousal immunity.
substantially more jurisdictions maintained spousal immunity than abrogated
it.202 Spousal immunity slowly lost hold until 1970, after which it became a
minority rule. 203 The Restatement (Second) allowed for tort suits between
spouses in 1979.204 By 1988, spousal tort immunity had been largely
eliminated in most jurisdictions.205 In those states that have retained spousal
immunity, many have identified certain types of actions to which spousal
immunity applies-generally for negligence, intentional torts, or vehicular
torts. 206
(discussing rationales for interspousal tort immunity after the Married Women's Property Acts).
194. See generally Siegel, supra note 82, at 2161-70 (providing a discussion of the justifications
offered by courts for maintaining spousal tort immunity).
195. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895F cmt. d (1979); PROSSER, supra note 179, at 122
(citation omitted); Tobias, supra note 187, at 389 (citations omitted).
196.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 895F

cmt. d (1979); KEETON ET AL., supra note 18,

at 902 (citations omitted); PROSSER, supra note 179, at 863.
197. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895F cmt. d (1979); PROSSER, supra note 179, at 863
(citations omitted); Tobias, supranote 187, at 390 (citations omitted).
198. 1 THOMSON/WEST, supra note 28, at 283-84.
199. Tobias, supra note 187, at 359, 383-98.
200. Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910).
201. Tobias, supra note 187, at 383, 409-22.
202. Id. at 383, 423.
203. Id. at 435.
204. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895F(1) (1979).
205. 1 THOMSON/WEST, supra note 28, at 92-96.
206.

2 THOMSON/WEST, supra note 69, at app. B. For the status of spousal tort immunity, see

Wayne F. Foster, Annotation, Modern Status of InterpersonalTort Immunity in PersonalInjury and

2014]

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE TORTS

725

4. The Role of Courts in Limiting Domestic Violence Claims
It is remarkable that courts across the country maintained spousal
immunity for tort claims through most of the 20th century.207 Even in some
jurisdictions in which spousal immunity has been eliminated, courts have
underhandedly maintained the doctrine. To do so, courts have asserted
policy reasons to retain spousal immunity for negligence actions and
intentional torts.208 Most commonly, courts have set different standards for
torts between spouses-thus effectively barring suits between spouses,
especially in the area of emotional distress.2 09 In some instances, courts
have even extended immunity to unmarried intimate partners. 2 10
In Twyman v. Twyman, the Texas Supreme Court held that spouses
could recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress only if the
tortious conduct was not considered in dividing the marital estate.2 11
Dissenting in part, Chief Justice Phillips went beyond the majority's
limitation of IED claims by explicitly stating that he believed that spouses
or former spouses could not use the cause of action for conduct occurring
during marriage. 212 He wrote:
In accordance with these sentiments, I believe that a tort which is
grounded solely on a duty not to inflict emotional distress should not be
cognizable in the context of marriage.
Married couples share an intensely personal and intimate relationship.
When discord arises, it is inevitable that the parties will suffer
emotional distress, often severe.213
Sheila Twyman alleged that William Twyman "intentionally and
cruelly" attempted to coerce the plaintiff into performing deviant sexual acts
during their marriage. 214 She testified that he pursued these activities even
though he knew she feared them because she had been raped at knifepoint
215
before the marriage.
The trial court found that the defendant in fact
Wrongful Death Actions, 92 A.L.R.3d 901 (1979).
207. KEETON ET AL., supra note 18, at 902-03.
208.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 895F

cmt. c, d (1979).

209. Foster, supra note 206, at § 2[a].
210. See Baron v. Jeffer, 469 N.Y.S.2d 815, 816-17 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
211. Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 625 (Tex. 1993).
212. Id. at 627 (Phillips, J., concurring and dissenting).
213. Id.
214. Id. at 620 (majority opinion).
215. Id. at 620 n.1.
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216

engaged in the alleged behavior.
Nonetheless, Justice Phillips argued that
the plaintiff should not recover simply because she was married to the
defendant.
New York courts have more directly maintained spousal immunity by
refusing to allow tort claims between spouses and other intimate partners. In
Weicker v. Weicker,217 the New York Court of Appeals denied the plaintiff
wife's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against her husband.
The court did so based on the marital relationship between the parties. It
reasoned:
Assuming that New York law now permits "recovery for the intentional
inflicting of mental distress without proof of the breach of any duty
other than the duty to refrain from inflicting it," strong policy
considerations militate against judicially applying these recent
developments in this area of the law to the factual context of a dispute
arising out of matrimonial differences. 218
In Baron v. Jeffer,219 the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the
State of New York extended the Weicker prohibition against intentional
infliction of emotional distress claims between spouses to a cohabiting
couple. In Baron, the plaintiff girlfriend sought damages for assault and
intentional infliction of emotional distress.220 The court upheld the lower
court's decision to dismiss the assault claim based on a statute of limitations
defense.221 The court then rejected the plaintiffs intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim, citing the reasoning in Weicker.222 The court
stated:
[I]t would be contrary to public policy to recognize the existence of this
type of tort in the context of disputes, as here, arising out of the
differences which occur between persons who, although not married,
have been living together as husband and wife for an extended period
of time (here, over two years).223
In New York, intentional infliction of emotional distress claims between

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id. at 620.
237 N.E.2d 876 (N.Y. 1968).
Id. at 876-77 (citation omitted).
469 N.Y.S.2d 815 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
Id. at 816.
Id.
Id. at 816-17.
Id. at 817.
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spouses and persons in marital-like relationships are still barred. 22 4 By
refusing to acknowledge intentional infliction of emotional distress claims in
marital and marital-type relationships, courts in New York are continuing
and expanding spousal immunity in modem times.
In New Mexico, courts are also fostering spousal immunity for
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims by setting an
insurmountable bar for claims between spouses. In Hakkila v. Hakkila, the
New Mexico Court of Appeals set a very high bar for intentional infliction
of emotional distress claims by one spouse against the other.2 The Hakkila
court found that IED claims must be viewed differently if arising out of a
marital relationship. While acknowledging that spousal immunity had been
abolished, the court articulated that there is only a "very limited scope for
the tort in the marital context." 226 The court reasoned that:
Conduct intentionally or recklessly causing emotional distress to one's
spouse is prevalent in our society. This is unfortunate but perhaps not
surprising, given the length and intensity of the marital relationship.
Yet even when the conduct of feuding spouses is not particularly
unusual, high emotions can readily cause an offended spouse to view
the other's misconduct as "extreme and outrageous." Thus, if the tort
of outrage is construed loosely or broadly, claims of outrage2may be
tacked on in typical marital disputes, taxing judicial resources.
E. Arnold Hakkila had perpetrated domestic violence throughout the
marriage, including repeatedly physically assaulting Peggy Hakkila,
insulting her privately and in front of others, and refusing to allow her to
pursue schooling or hobbies.228 The court held that Mr. Hakkila's conduct

224. See Chen v. Fischer, 843 N.E.2d 723, 725 n.2 (N.Y. 2005) (agreeing that New York does
not recognize intentional infliction of emotional distress claims by one spouse against another);
Artache v. Goldin, 519 N.Y.S.2d 702, 706 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (dismissing an intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim when parties lived together for fourteen years and had four
children together); Murphy v. Murphy, 486 N.Y.S.2d 457, 459 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (allowing a
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress between parties formerly in an intimate partner
cohabiting relationship because conduct on which claim was based occurred after the relationship
had terminated); Ferreyr v. Soros, No. 109256/11, 2013 WL 388009 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 22, 2013)
(allowing a claim for intentional emotional distress to proceed because "the parties [sic] relationship,
where the parties never lived together but at all times maintained separate households, falls well
short of the marital type relationship that would bar plaintiffs claim"). But cf Weisman v.
Weisman, 485 N.Y.S.2d 570 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (holding that plaintiff spouse had properly plead
her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against her husband).
225. Hakkila v. Hakkila, 812 P.2d 1320 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991).
226. Id. at 1324.
227. Id. at 1324-25.
228. Id. at 1321-22.
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was not sufficiently outrageous to sustain a claim for IIED.229
The court reasoned that "in determining when the tort of outrage should
be recognized in the marital setting, the threshold of outrageousness should
be set high enough ... that the social good from recognizing the tort will not
be outweighed by unseemly and invasive litigation of meritless claims." 2 30
Despite the repeated egregiousness of Mr. Hakkila's abusive conduct, the
court insisted that "[i]t would be unfortunate if the law closed all the safety
valves through which irascible tempers might legally blow off steam." 2 31
Hakkila, which was decided in 1991, is still controlling in New Mexico.232
As exemplified in Hakkila, some courts continue to maintain de facto
immunity in some types of domestic violence tort suits even when spousal
immunity has been abrogated.233 Insurance companies, too, have joined
these recalcitrant courts in perpetuating de facto immunity for domestic
violence torts through their policy exclusions.234 Two insurance policy
exclusions-intentional act exclusions and family member exclusions-act
to deny recovery to domestic violence plaintiffs through liability
insurance.235
5. The Lack of Insurance Coverage for Domestic Violence
Intentional act exclusions deny coverage for any intentional acts

229. Id at 1327.
230. Id at 1326.
231. Id. at 1324 (quoting Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of
Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033, 1053 (1936)).
232. After Hakkila, the New Mexico Court of Appeals allowed a plaintiff to recover against his
former wife for "fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, malicious abuse of process, and defamation" based
on events that occurred during the marriage. Papatheofanis v. Allen, 242 P.3d 358, 360 (N.M. Ct.
App. 2010). The court, citing Hakkila, said such recovery would be allowed because the claims did
not involve marital misconduct, details of the couple's personal relationship, or issues regarding who
was at fault for the dissolution of the marriage. Id. at 365.
233. For instance, South Dakota still retains spousal immunity for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Harbert, 741 N.W.2d 228 (S.D. 2007)
(holding that state policy prohibits extension of insurance coverage to intentional infliction of
emotional distress); Henry v. Henry, 534 N.W.2d 844, 847 (S.D. 1995) (holding that intentional
infliction of emotional distress claims will not be allowed based on conduct during marriage but will
be allowed based on conduct after divorce); Pickering v. Pickering, 434 N.W.2d 758, 761 (S.D.
1989) (stating that infliction of emotional distress claims are "unavailable as a matter of public
policy when it is predicated on conduct which leads to the dissolution of a marriage").
234. Jennifer Wriggins, Interspousal Tort Immunity and Insurance "Family Member
Exclusions ": Shared Assumptions, Relational and Liberal Feminist Challenges, 17 Wis. WOMEN's
L.J. 251, 252 (2002) [hereinafter Wriggins, Interspousal Tort Immunity and Insurance].
235. Id. at 252-53.
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236

Most homeowners, renters, and automobile
committed by the insured.
insurance policies do not provide liability coverage for intentional acts under
these intentional act exclusions.237 If a plaintiff sues for an intentional tort
and the defendant has homeowners or renters insurance, the insurance
company can successfully claim that the suit is not covered by the
defendant's policy based on the intentional act exclusion. 2 3 8 In this way, a
plaintiff can be "worse off if the tort . .. is classified as intentional rather
than negligent."239 Thus, domestic violence victims are essentially barred
from recovering under an insurance policy for a tort arising from domestic
violence because most such torts are intentional. Victims may be tempted to
argue that an injury resulted from the abuser's negligence in order to obtain
compensation.240 However, when victims must negate the intentional nature
of the abuser's act so that the harm will be covered by insurance, they are
recreating the downplaying of abuse that is commonly present in abusive
241
relationships.
Family member exclusions in insurance policies also deny coverage for
242
many domestic violence torts.22 Standard homeowners insurance policies
define insured individuals as anyone living in the home and exclude
coverage for any harm caused by one insured against another. 2 43 These
family member exclusions, which are included in most policies, exclude all
claims for harm caused by one family member to another, regardless of

236. Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, supranote 83, at 135.
237. Id. at 135-36. See also Wriggins, Interspousal Tort Immunity and Insurance, supra note
234, at 252; Wriggins, First-YearTorts, supranote 153, at 513.
238. Rick Swedloff, Uncompensated Torts, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 721, 739-49 (2012);
Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, supra note 83, at 136. See, e.g., Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. Co.
v. Coppola, 690 A.2d 1059, 1066 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (upholding the lower court's
decision that insurance company was not obligated to defend or indemnify defendant for his acts of
abuse against his former wife under a homeowners policy). See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § I cmt. f (2010) ("[B]ecause the express and implied exclusions
[for intentional torts] from the coverage provided by liability-insurance policies may not be
completely congruent with tort-law categories, the proper interpretation of these policy provisions
and public-policy doctrines is ultimately a matter for contract and insurance law, not tort law.");
Hazel Glenn Beh, Tort Liabilityfor IntentionalActs ofFamily Members: Will Your Insurer Stand By
You?, 68 TENN. L. REV. 1 (2000); Ellen S. Pryor, The Stories We Tell: IntentionalHarm and the
Questfor InsuranceFunding,75 TEx. L. Rev. 1721 (1997).
239.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM

§ 5 cmt. a

(2010).

240. Dalton, supranote 66, at 341.
241. Id.
242. Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, supra note 83, at 137.
243. Id. See generally Martin J. McMahon, Annotation, Validity, Under InsuranceStatutes, of
Coverage Exclusion for Injury to or Death of Insured's Family or Household Members, 52
A.L.R.4th 18 (1987).
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whether the harm was accidental or intentional. 244 Thus, if a wife sues a
husband for injuries arising from domestic violence, the insurance policy
will not cover the husband for the claim.245 The wife can only recover from
the husband's assets or their marital assets, but only if there are any assets or
sufficient assets.246 Some courts have struck down the family member
exclusion, especially in the automobile insurance context.247 These family
member exclusions were "designed with a view to protect . . . insurers from
collusive suits." 248
States also participate in perpetuating immunity for domestic violence
torts through regulation of insurance. State legislation controls certain
aspects of insurance contracts and markets.249 Intentional act and family
member exclusions, as supported by state regulation, operate to deny
recovery to domestic violence plaintiffs, especially those suing abusers who
are judgment proof or have few assets.250
Insurance policies, recalcitrant courts, and a long history of common
law resistant to redress for intimate partner violence have created a void
where domestic violence tort law might have developed but did not. During
the times of chastisement, coverture, and spousal immunity, domestic
violence plaintiffs did not have the benefit of a supportive movement to
encourage them to challenge the laws that barred these claims. The
251
Spousal
domestic violence movement did not emerge until the 1970s.
immunity became the minority rule in the 1970s as well. This could have
been a time when domestic violence tort claims came to the fore. Instead,
244. Wriggins, First-Year Torts Curriculum,supra note 153, at 513.
245. Wriggins, InterspousalTort Immunity and Insurance,supra note 234, at 252.
246. Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, supranote 83, at 137-38.
247. Wriggins, Interspousal Tort Immunity and Insurance,supra note 234, at 252-53 n. 11.
248. Id at 252 n.10 (citing ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW 393 §
4.9(c)(1) (1988)).
249. Wriggins, InterspousalTort Immunity and Insurance,supra note 234, at 255.
250. Jennifer Wriggins proposes insurance reform that would help ensure that domestic violence
plaintiffs satisfy tort judgments. Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, supra note 83. Under
Wriggins's proposal, liability insurance would be a mandatory part of automobile liability insurance.
Id. at 152. The insurance policy would cover domestic violence tort claims, and defendants would
be required to reimburse insurers for payments made to satisfy domestic violence tort judgments. Id.
These reformed insurance policies would also include "uninsured domestic violence tortfeasor"
provisions in case the abuser is uninsured. Id. at 127, 153. If the defendant is uninsured, the
plaintiff's recovery would be covered by the plaintiffs own uninsured domestic violence tortfeasor
section of her policy. Id. at 152-54.
251. See generally SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND
STRUGGLES OF THE BATTERED WOMEN'S MOVEMENT 53-131 (1982) (discussing the foundations of
the Battered Women's Movement); ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE MAKING OF
SOCIAL POLICY AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 182-200

(1987).
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the domestic violence movement was primarily focused on developing
shelters and criminal justice interventions. 252 In the meantime, insurance
companies stepped in to maintain spousal immunity and expand immunity to
non-married intimate partners through intentional act and family member
exclusions. Very few domestic violence tort claims have emerged from this
unfavorable history.
C. Other Reasonsfor Scarcity ofDomestic Violence Tort Claims
In addition to the gendered history of common law and insurance
exclusions, there are a number of other possible reasons that domestic
violence tort suits are so rare. 253
In general, intentional tort claims are infrequently pursued. The
National Center for State Courts reports that tort claims in general comprise
of only about 6% of all state court cases. 254 Of these, automobile tort cases
constitute the majority.255 Intentional tort claims constitute a small fraction
of tort cases, with intentional torts comprising of as few as 2.9% of all tort
claims in state courts in 1992. 256 Intentional torts have also been largely
omitted from tort doctrine and scholarship, with negligence and strict
liability dominating. 257 Torts including assault, battery, false imprisonment,
and intentional infliction of emotional distress have received little attention
from scholars and play an insignificant role in the field of torts generally.258
Instead, tort law "has been conceptualized as pertaining primarily to
252. See generally SCHECHTER, supra note 251, at 53-131.
253. For other explanations for the dearth of domestic violence tort cases, including reasons of
privacy, see Buel, supra note 146, at 949-55.
254. ROBERT C. LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE
WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2010 STATE COURT CASELOADS 3 (2012),
http://www.courtstatistics.org/otherpages/-/media/microsites/files/csp/data%20pdf/csp dec.ashx. In
2008, new tort claims comprised 4.4% of all claims brought in state courts. ROBERT C.
LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE
COURTS:
AN
ANALYSIS
OF
2008
STATE
COURT
CASELOADS
26
(2010),
http://www.courtstatistics.org/other-pages/-/media/microsites/files/csp/ewsc-2008-online.ashx
[hereinafter 2008 CASELOADS]. In 2007, such tort claims constituted 6% of all claims brought in
state courts. Id.
255. 2008 CASELOADS, supra note 254, at 28.
256. STEVEN K SMITH ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ
2
(1995),
CASES
IN
LARGE
COUNTIES
153177,
TORT
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdflTCLC.PDF. Only 2.7% of civil jury cases that went to trial in
state courts were intentional tort cases. CAROL J. DEFRANCES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 154346, CIVIL JURY CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES 2
(1995), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cjcavilc.pdf.
257. Wriggins, Feminist Revision of Torts, supranote 153, at 153.
258. Id.
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accidental injury that causes harm to strangers." 259
1. Financial Resources
Financial resources play a large role in determining whether domestic
violence torts suits are initiated. Representation in these cases is nearly
impossible to secure through a legal services or nonprofit law office. Any
legal services agency that receives funding through the federal Legal
Services Corporation (LSC) is prohibited from engaging in certain types of
activities and representation. One such restriction is that, with limited
exceptions, the agency cannot pursue a fee generating claim, unless the
claim has been either "rejected by the local lawyer referral service, or by two
private attorneys[,] or [if] [n]either the referral service nor the two private
attorneys" would provide a consultation without a fee.260 If the legal
services office satisfies this requirement and accepts a fee-generating case, it
must meet additional onerous paperwork and audit requirements. 261
Additionally, legal services or nonprofit law offices that receive funding
from the Legal Assistance for Victims ("LAV") Grant Program are
prohibited from using any grant funds to support litigating domestic violence
tort claims. 2 62 The LAV Grant Program, which is maintained by the Office
on Violence Against Women at the U.S. Department of Justice, is a primary
funder of legal representation of domestic violence victims. 263 This federal
funding stream for domestic violence lawyering was created by the Violence
Against Women Act of 1994 and was reauthorized in 2000, 2005, and 2013;
it made domestic violence attorneys in legal services offices more
commonplace.264 Even though the grant requires that grantees address a
"demonstrated need in their communities by providing services that promote
the dignity and self-sufficiency of victims, improve their access to resources,

259. Id. See also Wriggins, First-Year Torts Curriculum,supra note 153, at 514.
260. 45 C.F.R. § 1609.3(a)(1)-(2) (2011).
261. § 1609.4. See also 1609 Fee-GeneratingCases, LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, OFFICE
OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, https://www.oig.1sc.gov/aud/cs98/cs981609.htm (last visited Mar. 11,
2014).
262. OFFICE ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OMB No. 1122-0020,
OVW FISCAL YEAR 2013 LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOR VICTIMS GRANT PROGRAM 10-11 (2013),
http://www.ovw.usdoj.gov/docs/2013-lav-solicitation.pdf [hereinafter LAV 2013].
263. See id. at 3.
264. See Rhonda McMillion, Congress Moves to Reauthorize Laws Targeting Domestic
Violence, Human Trafficking,
A.B.A. JOURNAL
(May
1, 2013,
12:30 AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/congress_moves-toreauthorizelaws-targeting dome
stic violence human traffi/.
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and create options for victims seeking safety from perpetrator violence," 265
266
LAV grantees are prohibited from using LAV funds to pursue tort claims.
The Program specifically prohibits using grant funds to support legal
representation of victims in tort actions. 2 6 7
2. Attorney's Fees
The system for payment of attorney's fees also diminishes the number
of domestic violence tort suits. Under the "American rule" for attorney's
fees, "the losing party is not required to pay the winning party's fees."268
Generally plaintiffs pay their own attorney's fees. 2 69 The plaintiff can either
front the attorney's fees or seek representation on a contingency fee basis. If
the case is taken on a contingency fee basis, the attorney is paid a percentage
of the plaintiffs recovery. 2 70 If the plaintiff does not prevail, the attorney is
not compensated. 271 In the domestic violence context, this means that the
plaintiff must either pay the lawyer using her own resources or find a lawyer
who is willing to take the case based on a calculation that the claim will
prevail and provide sufficient recovery such that the lawyer's contingency
fee will be sufficient. Very few domestic violence victims will have enough
financial resources to pay an attorney to litigate a tort matter. Thus, whether
a domestic violence tort suit is brought can depend on the attorney's
expectation of recovery.
The possibility for recovery in domestic violence tort suits can be quite
low. Abusers often have little or no resources to seek through a tort claim.
Even if the plaintiff obtains a sizable damages award, the defendant may not
have sufficient resources to satisfy the judgment. Plaintiff-side attorneys are
reluctant to litigate cases when the chance of receiving a sufficient
contingency fee is small. Similarly, the plaintiff may decide that the
possible therapeutic, deterrent, or other benefits are not sufficient to warrant
filing a claim when the odds of financial recovery are low.

265. LAV 2013, supra note 262, at 18.
266. Id. at 10-11.
267. Id The LAV Program also specifies that grant funds cannot be used to support legal
representation in "[c]hild sexual abuse cases," "[clases involving the child protection system," and
"[c]riminal defense of victims charged with crimes." Id. Additionally, grant funds cannot be used to
support lobbying, fundraising, research projects, or physical renovations of office space. Id.
268. DOBBS, supra note 2, at 38.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
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3. Other Concerns
There are a number of other possible reasons that domestic violence tort
cases are rarely filed. A victim may fear retaliation by the abuser, and it
may not be safe for her to pursue a tort claim. A victim may prefer to avoid
contentious litigation for the sake of tranquility, especially if the abuser is
the father of her children. She may have had bad experiences with legal
processes before or may not be willing to experience the stress that litigation
may cause. The victim may have higher priorities for legal intervention,
including cases involving restraining orders, child custody, child support,
housing, and public benefits. Lawyers, too, play a limiting role in the
development of domestic violence tort jurisprudence. Domestic violence
attorneys tend to specialize, almost always in civil restraining order or
family law cases. 272 Even if their funding permits them to do so, these
attorneys may feel uncomfortable or unqualified to litigate tort claims. They
also may not be advising their clients about tort law as an avenue of relief.
If domestic violence victims are not aware of the availability of these claims,
they will not pursue them.
There are also procedural issues that can limit the number of domestic
violence tort suits. While these procedural complications in domestic
violence tort law are beyond the scope of this article, it is worth mentioning
the most common of them. Statutes of limitations, which are usually one to
six years for intentional torts, operate as a bar to many domestic violence
tort claims.273 A number of procedural complications can arise if there is or
272. See Camille Carey, Correcting Myopia in Domestic Violence Advocacy: Moving Forward
in Lawyering andLaw School Clinics, 21 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 220, 239 (2011).
273. See Dalton, supra note 66, at 357-63 (discussing the effect of statutes of limitations on
domestic violence claims and arguing for a universal tolling provision in domestic abuse cases);
Buel, supra note 146, at 1015-18 (arguing for the tolling of statutes of limitations in domestic
violence claims under the continuing tort doctrine to prevent abusers from defending on statutes of
limitations grounds); Jerry J. Phillips, What is a Good Woman Worth? Tort Compensationfor
Domestic Violence, 47 LOY. L. REv. 303, 308 (2001) (arguing for the application of the continuing
tort doctrine to domestic violence claims to prevent the "roadblock" of statutes of limitaitons);
Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, supra note 83, at 139-40 (explaining that because of the
"complex dynamics of domestic violence," many times when the victim is ready to sue, the statute
has already run); Edward S. Snyder, Remedies for Domestic Violence: A Continuing Challenge, 12 J.
AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAw. 335, 360-64 (1994) (arguing that domestic violence should be treated as
a continuing tort so that statutes of limitations will not operate as a bar to a victim's recovery);
Barbara H. Young, Interspousal Torts and Divorce: Problems, Policies, Procedures, 27 J. FAM. L.
489, 491-93 (1989) (discussing interspousal torts and the statute of limitations, and stating that the
"greatest impetus for bringing the tort action before or during the divorce is the running of the statute
of limitation on the tort"); Michelle L. Evans, Note, Wrongs Committed During a Marriage: The
Child that No Area of the Law Wants to Adopt, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 465, 481-83 (2009)
(discussing approaches to the statute of limitations problem in interspousal tort claims).
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has been a divorce proceeding between the parties. States may require that
the tort and divorce cases be joined if the tortious conduct occurred during
the marriage, and the abuser may raise res judicata or collateral estoppel as a
defense. 27 4 Also, boilerplate release clauses in divorce settlements or
judgments can prohibit a domestic violence plaintiff from bringing a tort
case.

IV. BENEFITS OF TORT SUITS FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PLAINTIFFS:
FINANCIAL BENEFITS, THERAPEUTIC BENEFITS, ENHANCEMENT OR
REPLACEMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE OUTCOMES, DETERRENCE

A. FinancialBenefits
Domestic violence victims largely shoulder the cost of the domestic
275
violence to which they are subjected.
They often must bear the cost of
medical and mental health treatment that results from an abusive
relationship.276 Separating from an abuser and establishing a new household
274. See Dalton, supra note 66, at 374-79 (identifying New Jersey as a state that requires
divorce and tort claims to be joined, and providing examples of res judicata barring victim's tort
claims "on the grounds that the issue of their partners' abuse was fully addressed in the context of
the divorce"); Buel, supra note 146, at 1000-07, 1010-14 (discussing joinder and presclusion issues,
and noting how "disproportionate division of property" is rarely employed "to provide some
measure of compensation for the harmed spouse"); Phillips, supra note 273, at 309 (explaining that
if a victim brings a tort suit after a divorce, "a court may find that the divorce is preclusive on the
issue of damages," and suggesting that "the best approach may be to try the divorce case first, with
open disclosure to the court of a pending or contemplated tort suit," with the fact finder being
permitted to consider the divorce award in the tort suit); Scherer, supra note 149, at 567-73
(discussing problems that joinder and preclusion create for domestic violence claims and providing
examples of state claims); Richard R. Orsinger, Asserting Claims for Intentionally or Recklessly
Causing Severe Emotional Distress in Connection with Divorce, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1253, 1295300 (1994) (identifying preclusion problems that may arise when brining an infliction of emotional
distress claim after a divorce); Snyder, supra note 273, at 354-60 (discussing joinder and preclusion
issues and warning that victims "must be vigilant in joining claims because a failure to do so can
result in a res judicata bar to future attempts to gain redress for tortious wrongs"); Young, supra note
273, at 500-03 (identifying "the greatest risk of the operation of res judicata and equitable estoppel
[as] postponing the tort claim," because although pursuing the tort claim first may permit the court to
"consider the tort judgment when it divides property and awards maintenance and child support," it
cannot "preclude a later divorce"); Evans, supra note 273, at 483-89 (discussing the effects of
joining torts and divorce actions, and explaining the tests courts use to determine if an interspousal
tort is precluded).
275. Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, supra note 83, at 147 ("[C]osts of these domestic
violence torts, financial and nonfinancial, are borne largely by the victims. . . ."). "Partial estimates
show that violent crime against women costs this country at least 3 billion-not million, but
billion-dollars a year." U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 632 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing
S. REP. No. 101-545, at 33 (1990)).
276. Barbara J. Hart & Erika A. Sussman, Civil Tort Suits and Economic Justicefor Battered
Women, VICTIM ADVOCATE, Spring 2004, at 3, 4.
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can be very expensive, and victims are usually primarily responsible for
financially supporting their children.277 Child support and spousal support
awards are often insufficient.278 Victims also may not receive court-ordered
child support or alimony-either because the abuser chooses not to pay or
because the abuser has lost his job due to criminal charges or
incarceration. 2 79 The criminal justice system allows for victim restitution,
but "in practice, only a small fraction of expended victims compensation
funds go to domestic violence victims."280 The types of compensation
available are narrow, and the amount of restitution can be insufficient. 28 1
Additionally, restitution frequently remains uncollectable.282
Financial recovery from domestic violence tort cases can not only help
victims meet immediate financial needs but also set them up for selfsufficiency and long-term safety. 2 83 Tort damages awards may help victims
compensate for economic losses sustained during the relationship, such as
personal property losses when an abuser has broken or sold the victim's
property, income and future earning losses when the abuser has controlled
employment or educational opportunities, and debt incurred by the abuser
that also binds the victim.284 While tort damages awards are not meant to
compensate for these specific losses, these awards can be particularly
meaningful to domestic violence victims given the economic challenges they
face. Abusers almost never bear any financial responsibility for the financial
harms caused by their abusive conduct, and tort suits can shift the financial
burden from the victim to the abuser through damages awards. 285
Tort claims offer domestic violence victims the opportunity to receive
monetary awards related to the harm they have suffered-including
277. Id. at 3-4.
278. Id. at 4.
279. Id.
280. Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, supra note 83, at 147 (citing Desmond S. Greer, A
TransatlanticPerspective on the Compensation of Crime Victims in the United States, 85 J.CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 333, 348 (1994)). See also Hart & Sussman, supra note 276, at 4.
281. Hart & Sussman, supranote 276, at 4.
282. Id.
283. See id. at 8 (instructing that "[i]t is important to view tort litigation as just one among
numerous potential legal strategies employed within a larger safety plan," because "the tort attorney
can assist in holding the batterer accountable for the violence, while helping the client achieve the
economic justice required for her safety and freedom").
284. See, e.g., id. at 4, 6. See generallyAngela Littwin, Coerced Debt: The Role of Consumer
Credit in Domestic Violence, 100 CALIF. L. REv. 951 (2012) (explaining how abusers coerce their
victims into debt, how debt prevents victims from leaving the abusive relationship, and what effects
"coerced debt" has).
285. Dalton, supra note 66, at 389-90 (noting that "the abuser never fully pays the bill
associated with his abuse," and that the tort system could better compensate victims).
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compensatory, nominal, and punitive damages.
1. Compensatory Damages
Compensatory damages are available to victims in negligence,
recklessness, and intentional tort claims. Compensatory damages include
medical expenses and other expenses proximately caused by the injury, lost
earnings and lost earning capacity, and pain and suffering. 2 8 7 The damages
are generally awarded in a lump sum, accounting for past and future losses
that are proximately caused by the injury.288 Compensable physical injury is
very common in domestic violence relationships. The incidence of physical
injury of victims in domestic violence relationships is extremely high.2 89 In
one study, 88% of victims were injured "in the most violent incident" of
domestic violence, with 67% of the victims suffering severe injury. 290In
addition, 32% of women had been injured "in the most recent incident" of
domestic violence, 5% severely. 29 1
A domestic violence plaintiff is entitled to recover for any pain and
suffering proximately caused by the tortious conduct. Recovery for pain
includes compensation for pain suffered at the time of or after the liabilitycausing incident and pain from medical treatment of injuries arising from the
incident. 292 Domestic violence also results in compensable mental harm,
including fear, anxiety, damaged self-esteem, depression, and post-traumatic
stress syndrome. 293 This harm is awarded as "suffering" in recovery for pain
and suffering.294 Domestic violence plaintiffs can seek recovery for
emotional anguish, distress, or any other negative emotional impact that
proximately results from the perpetrator's tortious conduct.29 5 Victims can
receive damages for these emotional losses themselves as well as the cost of
addressing these losses through psychotherapy and other mental health
286. See Dalton, supra note 66, at 390 ("The award can recognize pain and suffering, as well as
the tangible elements, such as medical expenses and lost earnings; punitive damages are also a
possibility.").
287. DOBBS, supranote 2, at 1048.
288. Id. at 1047.
289. See, e.g., JOHNSON, supra note 20, at 1 ("25-30 percent of women who come to emergency
rooms for injuries are there for domestic violence-related problems.").
290. Id. at 39, 92-93.
291. Id.
292. DOBBS, supranote 2, at 1050-51.
293. Id. at 41-43.
294. See Dalton,supra note 66, at 390 ("The award [against the abuser] can recognize pain and
suffering.").
295. DOBBS, supranote 2,at 1051.
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services, usually framed as medical and related expenses.
2. Nominal Damages
Domestic violence plaintiffs can pursue additional damages in
intentional tort claims. Nominal damages, which are not available in
negligence claims, are available for intentional torts. In negligence, the
plaintiff must suffer a legally recognized harm in order to have a cognizable
claim.296 For intentional torts, such as battery, sexual battery, assault,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and false imprisonment, the
legally recognized harm is the tort itself.297 For intentional torts, the plaintiff
can recover nominal damages and potentially "a substantial [additional] sum
without proof of any specific loss other than the tort itself."298 For instance,
a domestic violence victim who is falsely imprisoned may be entitled to
substantial damages even though she was not physically injured, did not
299
suffer from lost wages, and did not introduce evidence of emotional harm.
3. Punitive Damages
Domestic violence victims also can seek punitive damages for
intentional torts. Punitive damages are permitted in a great majority of
states. 300 Generally, punitive damages require a showing of serious
misconduct with a bad intent or state of mind like malice. 301 Many acts of
domestic violence constitute serious misconduct perpetrated by an abuser
who is intentionally causing harm. Thus, domestic violence tort claims are
ripe for seeking punitive damages awards. Punitive damage awards can be
problematic in that jury awards of punitive damages are subject to judicial
review and can be reduced or reversed.302
Punitive damages awards can be very important in a domestic violence
tort suit, however. Abusers commonly prevent victims from working or

296.
297.
298.

Id. at 1047 (footnote omitted).
Id.
Id.

299. Id. at 80.
300. Id. at 1062.
301. Id. at 1064; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1979) ("Punitive damages may
be awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the defendant's evil motive or his reckless
indifference to the rights of others. In assessing punitive damages, the trier of fact can properly
consider the character of the defendant's act, the nature and extent of the harm to the plaintiff that
the defendant caused or intended to cause and the wealth of the defendant.").
302. Phillips, supra note 273, at 310.
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seeking an education. 303 Women statistically earn less than men and tend to
occupy the homemaking role more frequently than men.3 04 These financial
disadvantages will play out in computation of compensatory damages
awards for domestic violence victims, who are largely women. Computation
of damages for lost wages and lost earning capacity are based on prior
earnings and projected future earnings.305 The combination of gender and
the financial abuse present in most domestic violence relationships will
ultimately reduce compensatory damages awards for lost wages or lost
earning capacity for most victims. 306 Punitive damages awards can help to
boost domestic violence victims' recovery to make it more on par with
damages awards given to plaintiffs who have not been financially
disadvantaged by gender and domestic violence. Punitive damages also
carry a punishing sting for the defendant, hopefully creating deterrence of
future abusive conduct.
Punitive damages may also provide some
therapeutic benefits to plaintiffs, as discussed below. 30 7 The purposes of
punitive damages are to punish the defendant and to deter him from
engaging in similar conduct in the future. 308
4. Examples of Domestic Violence Tort Damages Awards
The amount of damages awards in tort cases can vary greatly. 309 Most
domestic violence plaintiffs will not receive enormous damages awards.
Modest damages awards are common in the domestic violence tort actions
that have been brought.3o However, some awards have been in the
-311
millions.
303. Hart & Sussman, supra note 276, at 6.
304. Phillips, supra note 273, at 311 (citation omitted).
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. See supra part III.B.
308. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. a (1979).
309. See 1 THOMSON/WEST, supra note 28, at 99-107, 111-12, 118-34, 141-43, 143-46 for
discussion of domestic violence tort damages awards in specific cases. The majority of damage
awards for sexual abuse are between $60,000 to $250,000 but they can be as high as millions of
dollars. VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: LAW AND LITIGATION, supra note 16, § 17:21.
310. See, e.g., Alderson v. Alderson, 225 Cal. Rptr. 610, 612-13 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (awarding
a plaintiff who cohabited with her boyfriend for twelve years $15,000 in compensatory damages and
$4,000 in punitive damages for assault and battery for injuries sustained when her boyfriend broke
her arm); Henriksen v. Cameron, 622 A.2d 1135, 1138, 1144 (Me. 1993) (awarding $75,000 in
compensatory damages and $40,000 in punitive damages for intentional infliction of emotional
distress).
311. E.g., Results, DONOVAN & O'CONNOR, LLP, http://www.docattypi.com/Results.shtml (last
visited Feb. 8, 2014). In 2006 Chris Dodig obtained a $9.5 million judgment in the Berkshire
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In one Texas case, O'Keiff v. Christ, a domestic violence victim was
awarded $10.9 million in compensatory damages, $150 million in punitive
damages, and approximately $9 million in court costs and interest.312 The
husband, who was a plastic surgeon, shot his wife in the face, causing her to
lose her left eye and 95% of her hearing in her right ear. She required
thirteen surgeries to repair her shattered eye, nose bones, and frontal
sinuses.313 In another Texas case, In re Brown, Darlina Brown received a
multi-million dollar jury verdict after seeking recovery for domestic violence
tort harms as part of her divorce suit. 3 14 Brown claimed that her husband
Michael Brown, "a prominent surgeon ... beat [her while pregnant] so

severely that she went into premature labor." 3 15 She prevailed on her claims
for assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
On these
claims, the trial court awarded Ms. Brown a judgment of more than $5.2
million including $2 million in punitive damages.
In Massachusetts, Tawnya Underhill received a $9 million tort judgment
against her former boyfriend, Paul Rathbun. 3 18 The Berkshire Superior
Court made this award based on one incident of domestic violence. 3 19
Rathbun broke Underhill's neck during a domestic violence incident that
took place in a car at a resort in Massachusetts.320 Underhill was left
paralyzed as a result of the incident.321
In Curtis v. Firth, the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the trial court's $1
million judgment.322 In that case, the domestic violence plaintiff received a
judgment for $50,000 in compensatory damages for battery, $225,000 for
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and $725,000 in punitive

Superior Court on behalf of a quadriplegic client victimized by domestic violence. Id
312. 1 THOMSON/WEST, supra note 28, at 105-06 (citing O'Keiff v. Christ, No. 92-28795-A
(Dist. Ct. Tex., Apr. 6, 1994)).
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. In Re Brown, 277 S.W.3d 474, 476 (Tex. App. 2009).
315. Carolyn Magnuson, Marital Tort Lawsuits Can Make Abusers Pay, TRIAL, Feb. 2002, at
12-13.
316. Brown, 277 S.W.3d at 476.
317. Id (denying Michael Brown's petition for writ of mandamus while summarizing lower
court's decision on domestic violence tort claims).
318. Paralyzed Woman Wins Lawsuit in Pittsfield, TIME WARNER CABLE NEWS (Dec. 12, 2003,
http://capitalregion.ynn.com/content/54969/paralyzed-woman-wins-lawsuit-in10:56
AM),
pittsfield/.
319. Buel, supra note 146, at 952.
320. Id.
321. Id
322. Curtis v. Firth, 850 P.2d 749, 752, 762 (Idaho 1993).
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damages. 32 3 Carl Curtis and Sandra Firth had been living together in an
intimate partner relationship for ten years. 324 The relationship "was
characterized by cycles of violence." 325 Firth testified that Curtis sexually
assaulted her, anally raped her, and forced her to engage in sexual acts that
she found repugnant.326 Still more: Curtis publically screamed at Firth and
swore at her; he kicked her out of bed using his foot on her back; he shook
her so hard she feared she would fall off a boat dock; he slapped her on the
buttocks so hard that it left a hand print; and, he pulled her hair while
throwing her against a sink.327
Damages awards, large or small, provide financial compensation in an
effort to make the plaintiff "whole." Damages offer the plaintiff financial
resources for medical and mental health treatment and some financial
stability in the face of lost wages. They can also provide monetary
recognition of emotional harm and, in some cases, acknowledgment of the
egregiousness of the abuser's conduct through punitive damages. This
"transfer of a single sum from the defendant to the plaintiff' is intended to
be "the remedial embodiment of the correlative nature of doing and suffering
harm." 3 28 Damages awards can never fully right the wrong perpetrated on
the plaintiff by her intimate partner. However, as will be discussed below, a
domestic violence plaintiff can receive other nonfinancial benefits from
pursuing a tort claim against an abuser.
B. Therapeutic Benefits
Tort actions can provide domestic violence plaintiffs with nonfinancial
benefits beyond the financial gain offered by damages awards. Victims may
be motivated by the "psychological primacy of compensation" offered by
tort suits.329 However, financial compensation is not the only benefit that is
sought. A plaintiff may choose to file a tort suit in an attempt to meet an
emotional need or fulfill a moral imperative. 330 The literature on therapeutic
323. Id. at 752.
324. Id. at 751.
325. Id
326. Id. at 757.
327. Id.
328. Weinrib, supra note 60, at 513.
329. Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Compensation in Tort Law, 43 U. KAN. L. REv. 39,
48-51 (1994).
330. Edie Greene, "Can We Talk? " Therapeutic Jurisprudence,Restorative Justice and Tort
Litigation, in CIVIL JURIES AND CIVIL JUSTICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 233,
234 (Brian H. Bornstein et al. eds., 2008); see Linda K. Meier & Brian K. Zoeller, Taking Abusers to
Court: Civil Remedies for Domestic Violence Victims, TRIAL, June 1995, at 60, 64.
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jurisprudence offers some insight into the therapeutic outcomes of tort cases
for plaintiffs. Therapeutic jurisprudence examines how legal rules, legal
procedures, and the roles of legal actors-including litigants, judges, and
lawyers-act as agents in producing therapeutic or anti-therapeutic
consequences.331
Therapeutic benefits almost certainly occur when a
plaintiff is successful in her claim. However, the very act of being a plaintiff
in a tort suit has the potential to provide therapeutic benefits.
The therapeutic benefits for plaintiffs in tort suits generally encompass a
wide spectrum. A tort claim can help provide closure for a plaintiff.3 32
Pursuing a tort claim can aid in dissipating negative feelings, including
relieving the plaintiffs feelings of outrage, resentment, and anger.333 The
dissipation of these feelings can result from the satisfaction that the
defendant has been punished for the harm caused or that the plaintiff has
been compensated for the loss suffered.334 A court's finding of fault in the
defendant can soothe the victim's loss of dignity. 3 35 Pursuing a tort claim
can also be very empowering for the plaintiff.
The act of being a plaintiff in a tort suit also can aid specifically in the
healing process for victims of violence. Victims of violence usually desire
redress for the injustice inflicted on them, and the quest for compensation
can be an important part of the victim's recovery.336 The victim's primary
objective is not necessarily seeking financial compensation. Instead, she is
likely to be seeking an acknowledgment of harm, an apology, or public
humiliation of the perpetrator. 337
331. David B. Wexler, An Orientation to Therapeutic Jurisprudence,20 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM.
& CIV. CONFINEMENT 259, 259 (1994) ("The therapeutic jurisprudence heuristic suggests that the
law itself can be seen to function as a kind of therapist or therapeutic agent. Legal rules, legal
procedures, and the roles of legal actors . . . constitute social forces that . . . often produce

therapeutic or antitherapeutic consequences."); Michael L. Perlin, What is Therapeutic
Jurisprudence?,10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 623, 623-24 (1993).
332. See Shuman, supra note 329, at 50-51 ("[P]unishment of wrongdoers 'tends to relieve the
outraged feelings of those who have been hurt; after its infliction their anger abates, and they tend to
regard the incident as closed."').
333. Id.
334. See id. at 51 ("The resentment of the victim and of society can be appeased by punishment
(the criminal sanction) or satisfied by reparation (the civil sanction).").
335. See id at 50 ("[T]here is ample contemporary evidence to suggest that tort damages may
play a powerful role in the restorative process.").
336. JUDrrH LEwis HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY 190 (1992).
337. Id. Herman discusses the value of compensation in a victim's recovery but also notes the
hurdle that a victim's attachment to compensation can provide.
Id. "The quest for fair
compensation . .. also presents a potential trap. Prolonged, fruitless struggles to wrest compensation
from the perpetrator or from others may represent a defense against facing the full reality of what
was lost. . . . Though the fantasy is about empowerment, in reality the struggle for compensation ties
the patient's fate to that of the perpetrator and holds her recovery hostage to his whims.
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Involving the civil judicial system can offer the plaintiff
acknowledgment of and validation for the wrongness of the harms suffered.
Tort suits provide litigants with an opportunity to articulate their harms and
have their experiences validated. Plaintiffs file tort claims "as a way to be
heard and to have their claims dignified by a court of law."338 For a
domestic violence victim, the opportunity to tell a judge or a jury about the
abuse she has endured can be very powerful. Establishing that the plaintiffs
"case is worthy of judicial attention may provide satisfaction and validation
to some plaintiffs." 339 A verdict for the plaintiff can be extremely
therapeutic.
Tort claims also give domestic violence victims an opportunity to exert
power in an otherwise subordinating relationship. In general, the availability
of compensation through the tort system allows tort litigants to enlist the
"coercive power of the judicial system to reshape the power imbalance in
their relationships." 340
There is insufficient data concerning the therapeutic effects of
participation in tort litigation on parties. 34 1 Similarly, therapeutic
jurisprudence has not yet comprehensively addressed the extent to which
successful outcomes of tort cases assist in a plaintiff s restoration. 342
One article published in Canada examined the therapeutic benefits for
victims of sexual assault who were plaintiffs in tort suits.3 43 Bruce
Feldthusen analyzed the therapeutic jurisprudence implications for plaintiffs
in thirty-three sexual battery tort cases filed in Canada. 34 He found that
many of these plaintiffs reported therapeutic, nonfinancial motivations for
Paradoxically, the patient may liberate herself from the perpetrator when she renounces the hope of
getting any compensation from him." Id.
338. Greene, supranote 330, at 235.
339. Id.
340. Shuman, supra note 329, at 56. In studying the Mexican Zapotec courts, and the use of
such courts to reshape personal relationships, Laura Nader noted that "[t]he Zapotec ideal is not an
'eye for an eye,' but rather what restores personal relations to equilibrium." LAURA NADER, STYLES
OF COURT PROCEDURE: To MAKE THE BALANCE, IN LAW AND CULTURE IN SOCIETY 73 (Laura
Nader ed., 1969); PATRICK ATIYAH, ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAw 471, 553 (3d ed.
1980). ("When a person is involved in a dispute with another who he thinks has done wrong, and
when that other refuses to admit that he has done wrong (and sometimes even when he does admit
it), it may be a great satisfaction to the former to know that he has the right to summon the latter
before one of Her Majesty's judges for a public confrontation in which the latter may be branded as
in the wrong.").
341. Greene, supranote 330, at 235-36.
342. Shuman, supra note 329, at 50.
343. Bruce Feldthusen, The Civil Action for Sexual Battery: Therapeutic Jurisprudence?, 25
OTAWA L. REv. 203 (1993).
344. Id. at 206 n.5.
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suing.345 The plaintiffs' therapeutic motivations for filing a tort claim
included furthering the healing process, punishing the defendant, publicly
vindicating the wrong, and encouraging other victims.346
Feldthusen found that the prospect of financial compensation for a
plaintiff who has been the victim of sexual assault often is not the driving
motivator in filing a tort claim. 3 4 7 He noted that plaintiffs who file tort
claims for sexual battery often file and litigate these claims even if they
know in advance that there would be almost no prospect of collecting a
judgment.348 The ability to pursue a tort claim for these victims instead
offers them other nonfinancial benefits. 34 9
A study of the therapeutic benefits for domestic violence plaintiffs has
yet to be conducted. In the absence of empirical evidence concerning the
therapeutic benefits of tort litigation for plaintiffs in general, it is difficult to
determine whether the therapeutic benefits outweigh the counter-therapeutic
benefits. It is possible that the counter-therapeutic impact of litigating a tort
claim outweighs the positive consequences both for plaintiffs in general and
domestic violence plaintiffs in particular. Litigation can be a traumatic
process, and the continuing contentiousness of the case and attendant stress
can outweigh the benefits of pursuing the litigation.3o The litigation process
itself can halt or delay the plaintiffs process of healing and restoration. 3 5 1
Litigation often has health and mental-health costs for parties-sometimes
leading to lingering medical and psychological issues. 3 52 It is also time
intensive, taking away from the plaintiffs time for work, family, and
recreation.353 The victim may have negative experiences within the
345. Id. at 211.
346. Id. at 211-12.
347. Id. at 210.
348. Id.
349. While beyond the scope of this paper and not immediately related to domestic violence, it
is important to note that the body of research on victim participation in truth and reconciliation
commissions has been inconclusive on whether victim testimony has therapeutic value for the
victim. See, e.g., Debra Kaminer et al., The Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa:
Relation to Psychiatric Status and ForgivenessAmong Survivors of Human Rights Abuses, 178.4
THE BRIT. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 373 (2001) (finding that giving public or closed testimony to the truth
commission produced neither a notable therapeutic effect nor a notable counter-therapeutic effect
and that some individuals may have experienced testifying as either distressing or relieving); MARY
E. HAWKESWORTH, GLOBALIZATION & FEMINIST ACTIVISM (2006) (providing an overview of
victim testimony in tribunals on crimes against women that emulate war crime tribunals without any
specific discussion of the therapeutic benefits of such testimony).
350. Greene, supra note 330, at 233.
351. Id.
352. Idat239-41.
353. Id. at 239.
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historically male-biased legal system, and the abuser might file frivolous
motions or claims or exploit opportunities to call the plaintiff back into court
in an effort to assert dominance or create fear.354 A tort suit may also fail to
satisfy the plaintiffs need to be compensated by the defendant when a third
party-such as an insurance company-provides the payment to the
plaintiff.355
Each victim needs to make an individualized decision about whether the
potential benefits of tort litigation outweigh the possible drawbacks. For
some victims, the factors will weigh in favor of pursuing a tort suit. In
addition to the therapeutic benefits discussed above, there are supplemental
benefits that arise out of using the tort system rather than the criminal justice
system to address domestic violence harms.
C. Enhancement or Replacement of CriminalJustice Outcomes
Domestic violence tort suits offer many of the positive outcomes
available in criminal cases, but give the victim much greater control. In fact,
with criminal cases, the victim is often not even a party. Domestic violence
tort suits, on the other hand, offer a victim the opportunity not only to be a
party, but also to control the litigation to a large degree. Many of the
potential outcomes offered by criminal cases-deterrence, punishment,
accountability, and retribution-are also available through civil tort claims,
but with the added benefit of the victim being at the helm.
1. Primacy of the Victim
In criminal domestic violence cases, the government sues the perpetrator
for acts committed against the victim. The victim's interests are "considered
relevant in the criminal justice system only to the extent that they coincide
with the government's interest in bringing the perpetrator to justice." 5 The
police decide whether to arrest, and the prosecutor decides whether to
354. See Susan L. Miller & Nicole L. Smolter, "PaperAbuse": When All Else Fails, Batterers
Use ProceduralStalking, 17.5 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 637 (2011) (exploring "[t]he barrage of
men's frivolous lawsuits, false reports of child abuse, and other system-related manipulations,"
which "exert . . . power, force . . . contact, and financially burden . . . their ex-partners"); Mary

Przekop, One More Battleground: Domestic Violence, Child Custody, and the Batterers' Relentless
Pursuit of Their Victims through the Courts, 9 SEATTLE J. Soc. JUST. 1053 (2011) (examining "the
unfortunate prevalence and often unpunished abusive behavior perpetrated by batterers in our family
courts").
355. Greene, supra note 330, at 240.
356. Shuman, supra note 329, at 72 (citing Juan Cardenas, The Crime Victim in the
ProsecutorialProcess, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 357 (1986)).
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prosecute. The victim is almost never consulted about whether a criminal
case is filed, how it will proceed, and what outcomes will be sought. This is
especially true in jurisdictions that follow mandatory arrest and mandatory
prosecution policies. In fact, interactions with the police and the criminal
justice system can have anti-therapeutic effects for domestic violence
victims.3 57
Domestic violence plaintiffs, as opposed to the state, can determine the
course of the case in pursuing justice through tort claims. As the potential
plaintiff in a tort suit, the victim exercises significant power. To start, the
victim chooses whether to initiate a suit. If she does file suit, the victim
decides the legal theory for her case, and, except as limited by the power of
the court and influence of the other party, what evidence she will presentincluding factual evidence and expert testimony. 35 8 She decides when to
file-so long as it is within the statute of limitations-and has the power to
settle or withdraw the claim at any point. Tort cases also offer victims the
chance to define the harm suffered in the way in which they experienced
it.359

Pursuing remedies through civil as opposed to criminal courts can offer
additional therapeutic benefits to plaintiffs. The control offered by a civil
suit gives the plaintiff much more satisfaction with the judicial process.
Studies have shown that when an individual is a more active participant in
litigation and perceives that she has more control over the legal process and
outcome, the process is more satisfying to that individual 360 and seems
fairer. 361 Also, when individuals experience more control in litigation, they
are more likely to feel that justice has been served.362 Victims particularly
prefer a process in which they can participate, have a voice, and have some
control.
There is also some support for the idea that "by seizing control of
the litigation, by speaking out, and bringing the perpetrator to justice," the
victim "can restore her self-control and self-respect." 36 In the domestic

357. See Leonore M.J. Simon, A TherapeuticJurisprudenceApproach to the Legal Processing
ofDomestic Violence Cases, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 43, 62-71 (1995).
358. Feldthusen, supra note 343, at 216.
359. Id.
360. E. Allan Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants' Evaluations of Their
Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 953, 959-60 (1990) (arguing in
favor of formal process but warning that alternate dispute resolution may be more therapeutic than
trial for some litigants).
361. Idat958.
362. Id. at 973.
363. Feldthusen, supra note 343, at 217.
364. Id. at 216.
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violence context, when victims have control over the tort suit that they
would not have in the criminal process, they are more likely to feel satisfied
with the legal process, believe that the system is fair, and experience justice.
2. Standard of Proof
Tort suits also have a better chance of providing the victim with a
favorable outcome, given the different standards of proof in civil and
criminal cases. In civil cases, the standard of proof is the preponderance of
the evidence, while in criminal cases the standard of proof is the much
higher "beyond a reasonable doubt." Because the standard of proof for a tort
action is significantly lower, the plaintiff may be more likely to succeed in
imposing legal accountability, deterrence, and retribution for the defendant's
actions. In the domestic violence context, a tort plaintiff will have a lower
standard of proof in a civil court for proving the same or similar incidents of
abuse. If there has been a criminal conviction, the plaintiff may be able use
that conviction to support issue preclusion or a motion for summary
judgment related to the underlying act or acts in the tort case.365
3. Power Dynamics
The civil system is also more likely than the criminal system to create an
adjustment in the power dynamic between the victim and the abuser. The
criminal justice system is unlikely to address or correct the power imbalance
between the victim and the perpetrator.366 In fact, the criminal system may
recreate a power imbalance, with the criminal system and its players
asserting dominance over the victim.
Giving the victim legal power
through the civil system is "empowerment per se" and holds particular
significance in situations of power and control by an abuser. 368
[T]he victim's decision to file and maintain a lawsuit may be a source
of a cognitive shift.... Therefore, returning the initiative to the victim
may help redefine her sense of self as empowered. Filing a claim

allows the plaintiff to regain control over her life; she changes from a

365.

Betty Levinson, Domestic Violence and Tort Remedies, in LAWYER'S MANUAL ON

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: REPRESENTING THE VICTIM 247, 254 (Ronald E. Cohen & James C. Neely

eds., 2d ed. 1998); Kathleen L. Daerr-Bannon, Causes of Action in Tort for Spousal Abuse, 41
CAUSES OF ACTION 2d, at 407 §4 (2009).
366. Feldthusen, supra note 343, at 214-15.
367. Id.
368. Ronen Perry, Empowerment and Tort Law, 76 TENN. L. REv. 959, 975 (2009).
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helpless victim to an active vindicator of her rights and interests.369
By filing a tort claim, the victim rejects the abuser's "claim of superiority
and reasserts her autonomy." 370
4. Civil Claims in Lieu of Prosecution
The availability of tort remedies to domestic violence victims can be
particularly significant when the state declines to investigate or prosecute.
This is especially true given the low prosecution rate of domestic violence
crimes. Statistics on domestic violence reporting, arrest, prosecution, and
incarceration rates vary greatly depending on the study and the location of
the study. Most statistics reveal that individual victims rarely can rely on the
criminal justice system to punish, deter, or control an abuser.
One Department of Justice (DOJ) study found that in instances of
physical assaults of women by an intimate partner, only 7.3% of the
perpetrators were prosecuted.371 Of that number, 47.9% were convicted, and
of those convicted, 35.6% were sentenced to jail or prison. 37 2 In cases of
intimate partner rape, only 7.5% of the perpetrators were prosecuted; of that
number, 41.9% were convicted, and of those convicted, 69.2% were
sentenced to jail or prison. 373 In another study funded by the DOJ and
based on 135 studies, researchers determined that of reported domestic
violence offenses, 35.5% were prosecuted, while 57.6% of domestic arrests
were prosecuted. 374 A well-publicized study in Milwaukee found that 95%
of men arrested for domestic violence were not prosecuted, and of those
prosecuted, only 1% of those prosecuted were convicted. 3 75
A DOJ Special Report found that of perpetrators who were charged with
369.
370.

Id.
Id. at 975-76.

371.

PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE,
CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE:
FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY 51 (2000), available at

NCJ 181867.9, EXTENT, NATURE, AND

https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/181867.pdf.
372. Id
373. Id.
374. JOEL H. GARNER & CHRISTOPHER D. MAXWELL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NAT'L INST. OF
JUSTICE, NCJ 236959, THE CRIME CONTROL EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS FOR INTIMATE

PARTNER
VIOLENCE
97
(Sept.
30,
2010),
available
at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/236959.pdf.
375. Joan Zorza, The CriminalLaw of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 1970-1990, 83 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 46, 71 (1992) (citing Lawrence W. Sherman et al., From Initial Deterrence to
Long-Term Escalation: Short Custody Arrest for Poverty Ghetto Domestic Violence, 29
CRIMINOLOGY 821 (1991)).
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a domestic violence crime, 81.5% were charged with only a misdemeanor,
and about 18.5% were charged with a felony.3 76 The same report found that
more than half of these charged defendants were convicted, and that of those
convicted, more than 80% of the defendants received jail or prison time,
with the remaining convicted defendants receiving probation.37 7 A survey of
multiple studies of domestic violence criminal justice outcomes revealed that
the percentage of perpetrators receiving jail sentences ranged from no more
than 4% (in four of the studies) to 57% (in Brooklyn).378
While the rates of arrest, prosecution, and incarceration vary, each study
indicates percentages in which there are no outcomes whatsoever in the
criminal case. For instance, in the first-referenced DOJ study, if only 7.3%
of perpetrators of intimate partner assault on women are prosecuted, 92.7%
of perpetrators are not being prosecuted and the criminal justice system has
not achieved an outcome for the victim. This enormous gap indicates that
the criminal justice system is not adequately serving victims and that other
viable options, including remedies in tort, are needed.
5. Tort Claims when Victim Avoids the Criminal Process
Tort claims are also a useful alternative when a victim prefers that the
state not prosecute and the victim does not file a complaint, press charges, or
participate in the prosecution. There are a number of valid reasons why a
victim may choose not to mobilize the criminal justice system. The victim
may not want the perpetrator to be incarcerated out of concern for the
perpetrator or his children. 37 9 The victim may eschew the involvement of
the criminal system for financial reasons. The victim and perhaps her
children may be dependent on the perpetrator for financial support, including
for housing, food, payment of household bills, child support, or alimony. 380
Additionally, the victim may know that the threat of criminal sanctions will
not deter her particular abuser.
Domestic violence torts can be a good option for victims given that a
376. ERICA L. SMITH & DONALD J. FAROLE, JR., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, NCJ 228193, PROFILE OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE CASES IN LARGE URBAN
COUNTIES 2 (Oct. 2009), availableat http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pipvcluc.pdf (stating that,
of the 3,750 domestic violence charges in the study, only 693 were felonies and the remaining 3,057
were misdemeanors).
377. Id. at 6. The study was based on intimate partner violence cases. Id. at 1. These cases
made up 83% of the domestic violence cases filed in the 16 counties. Id.
378. GARNER & MAXWELL, supra note 374, at 75 tbl.3-3.
379. Feldthusen, supra note 343, at 227.
380. Id.

750

KANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

high percentage of domestic violence criminal cases are dropped. Statistics
on dropped prosecutions vary. In one study of cases filed in Chicago's
domestic violence court, 7,400 of 10,700-or 69% of-cases had been
381
In another study in Detroit, only 2.6% of domestic assault cases
dropped.
brought to the attention of law enforcement resulted in adjudication. 3 82
Victim noncooperation plays a role in the high rates of prosecution failure.
Some studies have shown that 78 to 85% of victims decline to participate in
prosecution.
These high rates of noncooperation signify that the criminal justice
system is not effective in meeting victims' needs. Tort remedies will not
suit all victims either. However, tort law does provide an important option
given the problems presented by the criminal system.
Many reasons that victims choose not to participate in prosecuting their
abusers relate specifically to the criminal justice system. Victims have cited
the following as reasons not to cooperate: prior negative experiences with
the criminal justice system, frustration with the process, having insufficient
information about how the system works, concern with prosecution's effect
on children, emotional barriers such as love for the abuser and fear of
retaliation, and lack of resources required to participate, such as time,
money, emotional support, and transportation.384 Victims also have faced
barriers such as getting the police to provide assistance and having the
system follow through with charges. 385 Some victims fear that invoking the

381. Deborah Nelson & Rebecca Carr, Some FrustratedVictims Talk of Taking Up Arms, CHI.
SUN-TIMES, July 24, 1994, at 18, available at http://www.highbeam.com/doc/l P2-4239618.html.
382. Maureen McLeod, Note, Victim Noncooperationin the Prosecution of Domestic Assault,
21 CRIMINOLOGY 395, 408 (1983).
383. ERICA L. SMITH ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ
214993, STATE COURT PROCESSING OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES 2 (2008), available at
(finding that "of domestic sexual and
http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfmn?ty-pbdetail&iid=1201
aggravated assault cases not prosecuted, 78% were dismissed or declined for prosecution because
victims would not cooperate"); Alafair S. Burke, Domestic Violence as a Crime of Pattern and
Intent: An Alternative Reconceptualization, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 552, 576 (2007) (summarizing
that researchers estimate that approximately 80% or more of domestic violence victims decline to
cooperate as complaining witnesses in the criminal prosecutions against their abusers, while only 10
to 20% choose to participate); Tom Lininger, ProsecutingBatterers After Crawford,91 VA. L. REV.
747, 768-69 (2005) (summarizing research that suggests that 80 to 85% of victims will recant at
some point). But cf Anat Maytal, Specialized Domestic Violence Courts: Are they Worth the
Trouble in Massachusetts?, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 197, 205 (2008) (citing studies that found that
"with the help of victim assistance programs, only ten percent of domestic assault victims in Los
Angeles refused to cooperate with the prosecutor, and in Santa Barbara, only eight percent refused to
cooperate").
384. KARIN V. RHODES ET AL., NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, VICTIM PARTICIPATION IN INTIMATE
PARTNER VIOLENCE PROSECUTION: IMPLICATIONS FOR SAFETY 48 (2011).
385. Id.at5l.
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criminal justice system could lead to involvement of child protective
services and possible removal of children from the home.1 6 Others
correctly perceive that prosecution or incarceration will affect the victim's
ability to receive financial support from the abuser. 387 A victim might
choose to opt out of the criminal justice system because the process is too
complicated, emotionally draining, burdensome, and "not worth the
hassle."
However, a victim's failure to participate does not necessarily
mean that she is opposed to the prosecution of her abuser. Barriers alone
can be enough to thwart her participation.389
Some of the barriers to participation in the criminal justice system may
also dissuade victims from filing tort claims. Victims may fear retaliation,
including further violence,390 or withdrawal of financial support.39 1 Others
may believe that abuse is a private or domestic matter. 392 Love or affection
for the batterer or hope for the relationship can also affect a victim's
decisions about whether to engage the legal system. These factors may
weigh against filing a domestic violence tort claim for some victims.
However, many of the barriers to participating in the criminal justice system
will not stand in the way of filing a tort case. The victim may have no
experience with the tort system, as opposed to a history of negative
experiences with the criminal justice system. Instead of risking losing
financial support if the abuser were to be prosecuted or incarcerated, the
victim may receive a substantial tort award, providing both immediate and
future financial support.
D. Deterrence
Domestic violence torts offer the potential to deter abusers from
engaging in abusive conduct. As discussed above, the criminal justice
system-with its low rates of prosecution, arrest, and victim participationoften fails to deter domestic violence. Additionally, some domestic violence

386.
387.
388.

Id. at 25-26, 47; Lininger, supra note 383, at 751.
Lininger, supra note 383, at 769.
RHODES ET AL., supra note 384, at 18.

389. Id.
390. ANDREw R. KLEIN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 225722, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE,
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CURRENT DOMESTIC VIOLENCE RESEARCH: FOR LAw ENFORCEMENT,
PROSECUTORS
AND
JUDGES
11,
46
(2009),
available
at

https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/225722.pdf; Lininger, supra note 383, at 769; RHODES et al.,
supra note 384, at 18.
391. Lininger, supra note 383, at 769-70.
392. KLEIN, supra note 390, at 5; McLeod, supranote 382, at 400.
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perpetrators are not swayed by the threat of criminal sanctions, including
arrest or possible incarceration. Financial sanctions obtained through tort
claims, however, can supplement or replace the deterrent effect of the
criminal justice system.
Deterrence is a foundational goal of tort law. In the tort context,
deterrence seeks to discourage certain conduct by imposing civil liability
when the conduct causes harm. 393 The aim of this deterrence generally is to
discourage the public from engaging in certain conduct in order to avoid
potential liability-as opposed to holding a party liable for tortious conduct
to deter future such conduct. 394 At least for now, the latter form of
deterrence is more applicable in the domestic violence context. Because so
few domestic violence tort suits are filed, it is extremely unlikely that an
abuser would be aware of this potential civil liability and alter his conduct to
avoid it. Until domestic violence tort law is well developed and well known,
domestic violence torts will do little to deter abusive conduct before a
lawsuit is filed. One would hope that once domestic violence tort law
becomes more established and well known, it will reduce abuse against
intimate partners.
Domestic violence torts also have the potential to deter subsequent
abuse by holding perpetrators civilly liable for prior abusive conduct. The
abuser's abusive acts will no longer be "private" after pleadings are filed and
evidence of the abuse is presented. A judge and possibly a jury will
scrutinize the defendant's behavior. The court's commitment of time and
attention to the harms inflicted will emphasize the severity and wrongfulness
of the abuser's choices. All of the above aspects of accountability occur
even in the absence of a favorable decision for the plaintiff.395 In addition,
the plaintiffs initiative in filing a tort claim may reduce the risk of future
abuse.396
If the domestic violence plaintiff prevails, the tort suit can offer even
greater deterrence. Payment of damages to the plaintiff will be a meaningful
and negative consequence for the abuser's behavior. The defendant may
experience payment of compensatory damages, meant to make the plaintiff
"whole," as punishment or retribution. If punitive damages are awarded, the
defendant is being explicitly punished for his conduct. In addition, a
judgment with a finding of liability for the defendant can make the
393. DOBBS, supra note 2, at 19.
394. Id.
395. Of course, this accountability is seriously eroded if the court finds in favor of the
defendant.
396. Perry, supra note 368, at 976.
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defendant feel "blamed, condemned, and humiliated."397 This result can
help to deter subsequent domestic violence.
I had the opportunity to witness the deterrent value of a domestic
violence tort case firsthand in Gyerko v. Gyerko.m This case was litigated
while I was co-supervising the Domestic Violence Clinic at Yale Law
School with Robert Solomon. 39 9 The parties, who were both natives of
Romania, had divorced after a violent and traumatic thirty-three year
marriage. Throughout the marriage, the defendant continuously subjected
the plaintiff to extreme physical, emotional, and sexual abuse. During the
two-year pendency of the divorce action, the defendant continued to threaten
and stalk the plaintiff. The defendant disregarded numerous civil restraining
orders and criminal protective orders. At one point during the pendency of
the divorce action, the police installed a video camera in the plaintiffs
bedroom to dissuade the defendant from breaking into the plaintiffs house.
The defendant broke into the house and destroyed the video camera. Civil
restraining orders, criminal protective orders, arrest, prosecution, and
incarceration did not deter the defendant. We represented the plaintiff in
filing a complaint alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress,
negligent infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and stalking.
The complaint requested an amount equal to the defendant's interest in the
marital property, or $54, 100.400 The facts of the case could have supported
many other counts, including assault and battery, but the statute of
limitations had run on those claims. After a trial and a judgment for the
plaintiff in the amount of $54,100, the defendant finally stopped his abusive
behavior.
V. SHORTCOMINGS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE TORTS
While tort law provides many positive outcomes for domestic violence
victims, its causes of action fail to capture some important aspects of
domestic violence. When an abuser perpetrates domestic violence, he
intends not only to cause the immediate, intended harm, but also to establish
power and control over the victim. While tort actions can grant recovery for
the emotional and physical harm of the immediate act of violence, they are
not well suited to provide recovery for the harm caused by the control
397. Lind et al., supra note 360, at 956.
398. No. NNH-CV09-5025827-S, 2009 WL 2357968 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2009).
399. For more information about the Yale Law School Domestic Violence Clinic, see Carey,
supra note 272.
400. Gyerko, 2009 WL 2357968, at *3.
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exerted over the victim by the abuser.
Domestic violence is a pattern of coercive control that constitutes an
"institution of confinement."401 Domestic violence "involves a pattern of
coercive control that is often much more debilitating than the violence
itself."402 Coercive control is a
course of calculated, malevolent conduct deployed almost exclusively
by men to dominate individual women by interweaving repeated
physical abuse with three equally important tactics: intimidation,
isolation, and control. Assault is an essential part of this strategy and is
often injurious and sometimes fatal. But the primary harm abusive men
inflict is political, not physical, and reflects the deprivation of rights
and resources that are critical to personhood and citizenship.403
Domestic violence can be seen as a "'liberty crime' . . . in which the

victim is deprived of basic freedoms in her personal life."404 The loss of
liberty inherent in the coercive control of domestic violence is a serious
harm that is not easily quantifiable and cannot be addressed by existing
common law tort claims. This non-compensable harm is serious, causing
victims to "feel like prisoners as they go about the rounds of daily
existence."A05
Tort law may also fall short in addressing the effects of minor violence.
Domestic violence is frequently defined by instances of severe violence, but
often a victim's most significant harm results from the effects of frequent
and recurrent low-level violence inflicted on her as part of the abuser's
efforts to maintain control.406 While this low-level violence is actionable,
plaintiffs may have more difficulty obtaining judicial recognition of these
harms as opposed to more serious violence.
Recovery for the harm caused by psychological abuse also may be
difficult to seek in tort. Psychological abuse, which can be particularly
harmful in the context of physical and sexual abuse, may not be
compensable outside the strict standards of IIED. Psychological abuse
encompasses a wide range of conduct intended to maintain domination over
the victim.407 Domestic violence perpetrators frequently verbally abuse their

401.

STARK, supra note 12, at 199.

402.
403.

JOHNSON, supra note 20, at 46.
STARK, supra note 12, at 5.

404.
405.
406.
407.

JOHNSON, supra note 20, at 46-47.
STARK, supra note 12, at 199.
Id. at 242-43.
DUTrON, supra note 23, at 25-27.
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partners, including demeaning them with name-calling and degrading
comments. 408 The perpetrator will focus on the partner's vulnerabilities and
attack her value as an individual or as a mother, homemaker, family
member, friend, employee, or member of the community. 409 A perpetrator
also may force a partner to engage in degrading conduct, like getting on her
knees and using a toothbrush to clean up food smeared on the floor by the
perpetrator or forcing her to pick up her children from a mistress's home.4 10
To control the victim, abusers sometimes threaten to take away, kidnap, or
411
This kind of
physically or emotionally abuse the victim's children.
emotional abuse, which causes serious harm to the victim, has no clear
correlate for compensation in tort law.
Tort claims generally do not compensate victims for losses that result
from financial abuse. Many domestic violence perpetrators use economic
tools to further control and dominate their partners.412 Abusers create
economic dependency and deprive victims of financial resources by
restricting the victim's ability to obtain or maintain employment or seek
education.413 In one study, 46% of domestic violence victims reported that
their abusers had forbidden them to work, and 25% reported that their
abusers prevented them from attending school. 414 Abusers often use
financial control to trap the victim in the relationship. 415 They frequently
maintain complete control over financial resources-including money-and
the food, transportation, shelter, clothing, and other basic necessities it
provides. 416 Abusers also often deprive victims of funds for basic needs or
keep them on a strict allowance, providing minimal funds on an as-needed
basis. 417 Abusers often restrict or deny the victim access to financial
resources, including the abuser's employment income, family funds, and the
victim's income from her own employment. These economic losses suffered
408. Id. at 27.
409. Ganley, supra note 11, at 13.
410. Id.
411. DUTTON, supra note 23, at 26-27. See also STARK, supra note 12, at 271-74 (discussing
methods used by abusers to control their victims).
412. WALKER, supra note 10, at 127-44 (discussing specific examples of economic deprivation
as an element of abuse).
413. Id at 137-39.
414. JOHNSON, supra note 20, at 39 (citing Stephanie Riger et al., MeasuringInterference with
Employment and Education Reported by Women with Abusive Partners: Preliminary Data, in
PSYCHOLOGICAL ABUSE IN VIOLENCE DOMESTIC RELATIONS (K. Daniel O'Leary & Roland D

Maiuro
415.
416.
417.

eds., 2001)).
JOHNSON, supra note 20, at 8-9.
Ganley, supra note 11, at 15.
WALKER, supra note 10, at 130-31; Littwin, supra note 284, at 982.
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by the victim generally cannot be recouped through existing tort remedies.
Tort law would need to be expanded to compensate victims for these losses,
as well as lost or deferred educational or employment opportunities.4 18
Tort claims also do not compensate for "social battering." Social
battering is the social isolation and humiliation that is frequently imposed on
victims by their abusers. 4 19 Abusers generally seek to control an intimate
partner's attention, time, activities, and relationships with friends and
family. 4 20 They intentionally isolate the victim and attempt to control her
time through accusations of spending too much time with family members,
children, friends, and others. 42 1 The abuser may prohibit his partner from
socializing. He may refuse to accompany her to social events or, if he does
accompany her, may humiliate her publicly. 4 22 These domestic violence
harms do not have ready remedies in common law torts or even in specific
domestic violence torts or gender-motivated violence suits.
VI. PARADIGM SHIFT IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: LAWYERING TOWARD
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE TORTS
Despite its limitations, tort law offers numerous, largely untapped
benefits to prospective domestic violence plaintiffs. An increased focus on
domestic violence tort law is an important step in a much-needed paradigm
shift in domestic violence lawyering. Criminal justice policies have become
423
Currently, civil
the primary strategy for addressing domestic violence.
domestic violence lawyering focuses almost exclusively on restraining
orders and family law cases-including child custody, child support,
divorce, spousal support, and paternity matters. Legal representation in
these cases is undoubtedly vital. However, this narrow approach fails
domestic violence victims on many levels. It prioritizes short-term safety,
care of children, and legally terminating the relationship over other values
like financial compensation, long-term financial security, victim
empowerment, deterrence, and abuser accountability. It also neglects the
other legal needs of victims-including assistance with housing, public
benefits, employment, immigration, consumer, and other matters. A

418. STARK, supra note 12, at 381.
419. WALKER, supra note 10, at 165-84 (discussing specific examples of social battering).
420. Ganley, supra note I1, at 14.
421. Id.
422. WALKER, supra note 10, at 170-73.
423. Deborah M. Weissman, The Personal is Political-and Economic: Rethinking Domestic
Violence, 2007 BYU L. REV. 387,402 (2007).
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continued focus on civil restraining orders and family law diverts attention
away from other productive avenues for relief, especially tort law. Tort
claims need to comprise a much larger percentage of legal actions brought to
address domestic violence.
Employing tort law to address domestic violence harms is an important
step in the development of legal doctrine that reflects sex equality in its
handling of violence. Filing tort claims for domestic violence will bring
intimate partner violence out of family courts. Family courts are often seen
as forums for "private" matters. Domestic violence tort claims are heard in
general civil courts, giving these claims the same level of importance as
other claims between strangers or non-intimate parties.
Offering a dignified forum for domestic violence victims to pursue their
claims will give them a chance to experience greater justice. Having a court
conduct a dignified proceeding about the domestic violence the victim has
suffered conveys to the victim that it takes her and her harm seriously. The
proceeding itself can assure the victim of her importance and that domestic
violence is a serious matter.424
Opening up this field of litigation will affirm the unacceptability of
domestic violence. After more tort claims are filed, courts will become
accustomed to adjudicating such claims. This will encourage more attorneys
to file domestic violence tort actions and create victim awareness of the
benefits offered by these actions. If these tort claims become commonplace,
they could alter abusive behavior throughout society. On the individual
level, a tort suit or the threat of a tort suit could deter abusive conduct in
individual relationships. We should aspire to create a new approach to the
representation of domestic violence victims in which cases are frequently
litigated, domestic violence victims are supported, and intimate partners
engage in little or no abusive conduct.
VII. CONCLUSION
It is time to bring tort law to the fore of domestic violence advocacy.
Coverture, chastisement, and spousal immunity historically shielded abusers
424. Lind et al., supra note 360, at 981 ("[D]ignified procedures tend to provoke favorable
responses because under them litigants feel that the court accords importance to the persons and
subject matter involved in the dispute. Thus, for our tort litigants, the fact the court was willing to
undertake a dignified hearing of the dispute may have constituted evidence that the civil justice
system took the litigants and the dispute seriously. The fact that their case was deemed important
enough to receive so respectufil a hearing was probably quite flattering. After all, the trial was in all
likelihood one of the most meticulous, most individualized interactions that the litigant had ever
experienced in the course of his or her contacts with government agencies.").
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from civil liability. Coverture and chastisement have been eliminated, and
spousal immunity has been limited or abrogated in almost all states.
Insurance policy exclusions and recalcitrant courts continue to pose
obstacles to domestic violence tort suits. Domestic violence plaintiffs and
their lawyers need to engage courts and the insurance industry to remove the
remaining obstacles to domestic violence tort suits. States should legislate
specific domestic violence tort causes of action, and courts should welcome
novel domestic violence tort claims. Through increased attention to
domestic violence tort law, we can overcome the vestiges of chastisement,
coverture, spousal immunity, and outdated sexist courts.
Domestic violence victims are independent legal beings who can sue
spouses and intimate partners for tortious domestic violence acts. Domestic
violence torts have not been a predominate aspect of our laws or popular
culture. Now that these archaic doctrines of gender discrimination have
been removed, lawyers should bring these claims into the mainstream legal
landscape.

